Examples with TrustAnchor java.security.cert.TrustAnchor used on opensource projects

Example 61 with TrustAnchor

use of java.security.cert.TrustAnchor in project XobotOS by xamarin.

the class PKIXCertPathValidatorSpi method engineValidate.

// END android-added
public CertPathValidatorResult engineValidate(CertPath certPath, CertPathParameters params) throws CertPathValidatorException, InvalidAlgorithmParameterException {
    if (!(params instanceof PKIXParameters)) {
        throw new InvalidAlgorithmParameterException("Parameters must be a " + PKIXParameters.class.getName() + " instance.");
    }
    ExtendedPKIXParameters paramsPKIX;
    if (params instanceof ExtendedPKIXParameters) {
        paramsPKIX = (ExtendedPKIXParameters) params;
    } else {
        paramsPKIX = ExtendedPKIXParameters.getInstance((PKIXParameters) params);
    }
    if (paramsPKIX.getTrustAnchors() == null) {
        throw new InvalidAlgorithmParameterException("trustAnchors is null, this is not allowed for certification path validation.");
    }
    //
    // 6.1.1 - inputs
    //
    //
    // (a)
    //
    List certs = certPath.getCertificates();
    int n = certs.size();
    if (certs.isEmpty()) {
        throw new CertPathValidatorException("Certification path is empty.", null, certPath, 0);
    }
    // BEGIN android-added
    {
        X509Certificate cert = (X509Certificate) certs.get(0);
        if (cert != null) {
            BigInteger serial = cert.getSerialNumber();
            if (serial != null && SERIAL_BLACKLIST.contains(serial)) {
                // emulate CRL exception message in RFC3280CertPathUtilities.checkCRLs
                String message = "Certificate revocation of serial 0x" + serial.toString(16);
                System.out.println(message);
                AnnotatedException e = new AnnotatedException(message);
                throw new CertPathValidatorException(e.getMessage(), e, certPath, 0);
            }
        }
    }
    // END android-added
    //
    // (b)
    //
    // Date validDate = CertPathValidatorUtilities.getValidDate(paramsPKIX);
    //
    // (c)
    //
    Set userInitialPolicySet = paramsPKIX.getInitialPolicies();
    //
    // (d)
    // 
    TrustAnchor trust;
    try {
        trust = CertPathValidatorUtilities.findTrustAnchor((X509Certificate) certs.get(certs.size() - 1), paramsPKIX.getTrustAnchors(), paramsPKIX.getSigProvider());
    } catch (AnnotatedException e) {
        throw new CertPathValidatorException(e.getMessage(), e, certPath, certs.size() - 1);
    }
    if (trust == null) {
        throw new CertPathValidatorException("Trust anchor for certification path not found.", null, certPath, -1);
    }
    //
    // (e), (f), (g) are part of the paramsPKIX object.
    //
    Iterator certIter;
    int index = 0;
    int i;
    // Certificate for each interation of the validation loop
    // Signature information for each iteration of the validation loop
    //
    // 6.1.2 - setup
    //
    //
    // (a)
    //
    List[] policyNodes = new ArrayList[n + 1];
    for (int j = 0; j < policyNodes.length; j++) {
        policyNodes[j] = new ArrayList();
    }
    Set policySet = new HashSet();
    policySet.add(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.ANY_POLICY);
    PKIXPolicyNode validPolicyTree = new PKIXPolicyNode(new ArrayList(), 0, policySet, null, new HashSet(), RFC3280CertPathUtilities.ANY_POLICY, false);
    policyNodes[0].add(validPolicyTree);
    //
    // (b) and (c)
    //
    PKIXNameConstraintValidator nameConstraintValidator = new PKIXNameConstraintValidator();
    // (d)
    //
    int explicitPolicy;
    Set acceptablePolicies = new HashSet();
    if (paramsPKIX.isExplicitPolicyRequired()) {
        explicitPolicy = 0;
    } else {
        explicitPolicy = n + 1;
    }
    //
    // (e)
    //
    int inhibitAnyPolicy;
    if (paramsPKIX.isAnyPolicyInhibited()) {
        inhibitAnyPolicy = 0;
    } else {
        inhibitAnyPolicy = n + 1;
    }
    //
    // (f)
    //
    int policyMapping;
    if (paramsPKIX.isPolicyMappingInhibited()) {
        policyMapping = 0;
    } else {
        policyMapping = n + 1;
    }
    //
    // (g), (h), (i), (j)
    //
    PublicKey workingPublicKey;
    X500Principal workingIssuerName;
    X509Certificate sign = trust.getTrustedCert();
    try {
        if (sign != null) {
            workingIssuerName = CertPathValidatorUtilities.getSubjectPrincipal(sign);
            workingPublicKey = sign.getPublicKey();
        } else {
            workingIssuerName = new X500Principal(trust.getCAName());
            workingPublicKey = trust.getCAPublicKey();
        }
    } catch (IllegalArgumentException ex) {
        throw new ExtCertPathValidatorException("Subject of trust anchor could not be (re)encoded.", ex, certPath, -1);
    }
    AlgorithmIdentifier workingAlgId = null;
    try {
        workingAlgId = CertPathValidatorUtilities.getAlgorithmIdentifier(workingPublicKey);
    } catch (CertPathValidatorException e) {
        throw new ExtCertPathValidatorException("Algorithm identifier of public key of trust anchor could not be read.", e, certPath, -1);
    }
    DERObjectIdentifier workingPublicKeyAlgorithm = workingAlgId.getObjectId();
    DEREncodable workingPublicKeyParameters = workingAlgId.getParameters();
    //
    // (k)
    //
    int maxPathLength = n;
    if (paramsPKIX.getTargetConstraints() != null && !paramsPKIX.getTargetConstraints().match((X509Certificate) certs.get(0))) {
        throw new ExtCertPathValidatorException("Target certificate in certification path does not match targetConstraints.", null, certPath, 0);
    }
    // 
    // initialize CertPathChecker's
    //
    List pathCheckers = paramsPKIX.getCertPathCheckers();
    certIter = pathCheckers.iterator();
    while (certIter.hasNext()) {
        ((PKIXCertPathChecker) certIter.next()).init(false);
    }
    X509Certificate cert = null;
    for (index = certs.size() - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
        // BEGIN android-added
        if (isPublicKeyBlackListed(workingPublicKey)) {
            // emulate CRL exception message in RFC3280CertPathUtilities.checkCRLs
            String message = "Certificate revocation of public key " + workingPublicKey;
            System.out.println(message);
            AnnotatedException e = new AnnotatedException(message);
            throw new CertPathValidatorException(e.getMessage(), e, certPath, index);
        }
        // END android-added
        // try
        // {
        //
        // i as defined in the algorithm description
        //
        i = n - index;
        //
        // set certificate to be checked in this round
        // sign and workingPublicKey and workingIssuerName are set
        // at the end of the for loop and initialized the
        // first time from the TrustAnchor
        //
        cert = (X509Certificate) certs.get(index);
        boolean verificationAlreadyPerformed = (index == certs.size() - 1);
        //
        // 6.1.3
        //
        RFC3280CertPathUtilities.processCertA(certPath, paramsPKIX, index, workingPublicKey, verificationAlreadyPerformed, workingIssuerName, sign);
        RFC3280CertPathUtilities.processCertBC(certPath, index, nameConstraintValidator);
        validPolicyTree = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.processCertD(certPath, index, acceptablePolicies, validPolicyTree, policyNodes, inhibitAnyPolicy);
        validPolicyTree = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.processCertE(certPath, index, validPolicyTree);
        RFC3280CertPathUtilities.processCertF(certPath, index, validPolicyTree, explicitPolicy);
        if (i != n) {
            if (cert != null && cert.getVersion() == 1) {
                throw new CertPathValidatorException("Version 1 certificates can't be used as CA ones.", null, certPath, index);
            }
            RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertA(certPath, index);
            validPolicyTree = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareCertB(certPath, index, policyNodes, validPolicyTree, policyMapping);
            RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertG(certPath, index, nameConstraintValidator);
            // (h)
            explicitPolicy = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertH1(certPath, index, explicitPolicy);
            policyMapping = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertH2(certPath, index, policyMapping);
            inhibitAnyPolicy = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertH3(certPath, index, inhibitAnyPolicy);
            //
            // (i)
            //
            explicitPolicy = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertI1(certPath, index, explicitPolicy);
            policyMapping = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertI2(certPath, index, policyMapping);
            // (j)
            inhibitAnyPolicy = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertJ(certPath, index, inhibitAnyPolicy);
            // (k)
            RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertK(certPath, index);
            // (l)
            maxPathLength = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertL(certPath, index, maxPathLength);
            // (m)
            maxPathLength = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertM(certPath, index, maxPathLength);
            // (n)
            RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertN(certPath, index);
            Set criticalExtensions = cert.getCriticalExtensionOIDs();
            if (criticalExtensions != null) {
                criticalExtensions = new HashSet(criticalExtensions);
                // these extensions are handled by the algorithm
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.KEY_USAGE);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.CERTIFICATE_POLICIES);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.POLICY_MAPPINGS);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.INHIBIT_ANY_POLICY);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.ISSUING_DISTRIBUTION_POINT);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.DELTA_CRL_INDICATOR);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.POLICY_CONSTRAINTS);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.BASIC_CONSTRAINTS);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME);
                criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.NAME_CONSTRAINTS);
            } else {
                criticalExtensions = new HashSet();
            }
            // (o)
            RFC3280CertPathUtilities.prepareNextCertO(certPath, index, criticalExtensions, pathCheckers);
            // set signing certificate for next round
            sign = cert;
            // (c)
            workingIssuerName = CertPathValidatorUtilities.getSubjectPrincipal(sign);
            // (d)
            try {
                workingPublicKey = CertPathValidatorUtilities.getNextWorkingKey(certPath.getCertificates(), index);
            } catch (CertPathValidatorException e) {
                throw new CertPathValidatorException("Next working key could not be retrieved.", e, certPath, index);
            }
            workingAlgId = CertPathValidatorUtilities.getAlgorithmIdentifier(workingPublicKey);
            // (f)
            workingPublicKeyAlgorithm = workingAlgId.getObjectId();
            // (e)
            workingPublicKeyParameters = workingAlgId.getParameters();
        }
    }
    //
    // 6.1.5 Wrap-up procedure
    //
    explicitPolicy = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.wrapupCertA(explicitPolicy, cert);
    explicitPolicy = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.wrapupCertB(certPath, index + 1, explicitPolicy);
    //
    // (c) (d) and (e) are already done
    //
    //
    // (f)
    //
    Set criticalExtensions = cert.getCriticalExtensionOIDs();
    if (criticalExtensions != null) {
        criticalExtensions = new HashSet(criticalExtensions);
        // these extensions are handled by the algorithm
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.KEY_USAGE);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.CERTIFICATE_POLICIES);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.POLICY_MAPPINGS);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.INHIBIT_ANY_POLICY);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.ISSUING_DISTRIBUTION_POINT);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.DELTA_CRL_INDICATOR);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.POLICY_CONSTRAINTS);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.BASIC_CONSTRAINTS);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.NAME_CONSTRAINTS);
        criticalExtensions.remove(RFC3280CertPathUtilities.CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS);
    } else {
        criticalExtensions = new HashSet();
    }
    RFC3280CertPathUtilities.wrapupCertF(certPath, index + 1, pathCheckers, criticalExtensions);
    PKIXPolicyNode intersection = RFC3280CertPathUtilities.wrapupCertG(certPath, paramsPKIX, userInitialPolicySet, index + 1, policyNodes, validPolicyTree, acceptablePolicies);
    if ((explicitPolicy > 0) || (intersection != null)) {
        return new PKIXCertPathValidatorResult(trust, intersection, cert.getPublicKey());
    }
    throw new CertPathValidatorException("Path processing failed on policy.", null, certPath, index);
}

Example 62 with TrustAnchor

use of java.security.cert.TrustAnchor in project XobotOS by xamarin.

the class ExtendedPKIXParameters method setTrustedACIssuers.

/**
     * Sets the trusted attribute certificate issuers. If attribute certificates
     * is verified the trusted AC issuers must be set.
     * <p>
     * The <code>trustedACIssuers</code> must be a <code>Set</code> of
     * <code>TrustAnchor</code>
     * <p>
     * The given set is cloned.
     * 
     * @param trustedACIssuers The trusted AC issuers to set. Is never
     *            <code>null</code>.
     * @throws ClassCastException if an element of <code>stores</code> is not
     *             a <code>TrustAnchor</code>.
     */
public void setTrustedACIssuers(Set trustedACIssuers) {
    if (trustedACIssuers == null) {
        this.trustedACIssuers.clear();
        return;
    }
    for (Iterator it = trustedACIssuers.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
        if (!(it.next() instanceof TrustAnchor)) {
            throw new ClassCastException("All elements of set must be " + "of type " + TrustAnchor.class.getName() + ".");
        }
    }
    this.trustedACIssuers.clear();
    this.trustedACIssuers.addAll(trustedACIssuers);
}

Example 63 with TrustAnchor

use of java.security.cert.TrustAnchor in project XobotOS by xamarin.

the class TrustManagerImpl method checkTrusted.

private void checkTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain, String authType) throws CertificateException {
    if (chain == null || chain.length == 0 || authType == null || authType.length() == 0) {
        throw new IllegalArgumentException("null or zero-length parameter");
    }
    if (err != null) {
        throw new CertificateException(err);
    }
    Set<TrustAnchor> trustAnchors = new HashSet<TrustAnchor>();
    X509Certificate[] newChain = cleanupCertChainAndFindTrustAnchors(chain, trustAnchors);
    if (newChain.length == 0) {
        // chain was entirely trusted, skip the validator
        return;
    }
    CertPath certPath = factory.generateCertPath(Arrays.asList(newChain));
    if (trustAnchors.isEmpty()) {
        throw new CertificateException(new CertPathValidatorException("Trust anchor for certification path not found.", null, certPath, -1));
    }
    try {
        PKIXParameters params = new PKIXParameters(trustAnchors);
        params.setRevocationEnabled(false);
        validator.validate(certPath, params);
        // cleanupCertChainAndFindTrustAnchors.  http://b/3404902
        for (int i = 1; i < newChain.length; i++) {
            trustedCertificateIndex.index(newChain[i]);
        }
    } catch (InvalidAlgorithmParameterException e) {
        throw new CertificateException(e);
    } catch (CertPathValidatorException e) {
        throw new CertificateException(e);
    }
}

Example 64 with TrustAnchor

use of java.security.cert.TrustAnchor in project XobotOS by xamarin.

the class TrustManagerImpl method findTrustAnchorByIssuerAndSignature.

private TrustAnchor findTrustAnchorByIssuerAndSignature(X509Certificate lastCert) {
    TrustAnchor trustAnchor = trustedCertificateIndex.findByIssuerAndSignature(lastCert);
    if (trustAnchor != null) {
        return trustAnchor;
    }
    if (trustedCertificateStore == null) {
        return null;
    }
    // we have a KeyStore and the issuer of the last cert in
    // the chain seems to be missing from the
    // TrustedCertificateIndex, check the KeyStore for a hit
    X509Certificate issuer = trustedCertificateStore.findIssuer(lastCert);
    if (issuer != null) {
        return trustedCertificateIndex.index(issuer);
    }
    return null;
}

Example 65 with TrustAnchor

use of java.security.cert.TrustAnchor in project XobotOS by xamarin.

the class TrustManagerImpl method cleanupCertChainAndFindTrustAnchors.

/**
     * Clean up the certificate chain, returning a cleaned up chain,
     * which may be a new array instance if elements were removed.
     * Theoretically, we shouldn't have to do this, but various web
     * servers in practice are mis-configured to have out-of-order
     * certificates, expired self-issued root certificate, or CAs with
     * unsupported signature algorithms such as
     * md2WithRSAEncryption. This also handles removing old certs
     * after bridge CA certs.
     */
private X509Certificate[] cleanupCertChainAndFindTrustAnchors(X509Certificate[] chain, Set<TrustAnchor> trustAnchors) {
    X509Certificate[] original = chain;
    // 1. Clean the received certificates chain.
    int currIndex;
    // is the leaf certificate (server or client cert).
    for (currIndex = 0; currIndex < chain.length; currIndex++) {
        // If the current cert is a TrustAnchor, we can ignore the rest of the chain.
        // This avoids including "bridge" CA certs that added for legacy compatability.
        TrustAnchor trustAnchor = findTrustAnchorBySubjectAndPublicKey(chain[currIndex]);
        if (trustAnchor != null) {
            trustAnchors.add(trustAnchor);
            currIndex--;
            break;
        }
        // Walk the rest of the chain to find a "subject" matching
        // the "issuer" of the current certificate. In a properly
        // order chain this should be the next cert and be fast.
        // If not, we reorder things to be as the validator will
        // expect.
        boolean foundNext = false;
        for (int nextIndex = currIndex + 1; nextIndex < chain.length; nextIndex++) {
            if (chain[currIndex].getIssuerDN().equals(chain[nextIndex].getSubjectDN())) {
                foundNext = true;
                // Exchange certificates so that 0 through currIndex + 1 are in proper order
                if (nextIndex != currIndex + 1) {
                    // don't mutuate original chain, which may be directly from an SSLSession
                    if (chain == original) {
                        chain = original.clone();
                    }
                    X509Certificate tempCertificate = chain[nextIndex];
                    chain[nextIndex] = chain[currIndex + 1];
                    chain[currIndex + 1] = tempCertificate;
                }
                break;
            }
        }
        // chain.
        if (!foundNext) {
            break;
        }
    }
    // 2. If the chain is now shorter, copy to an appropriately sized array.
    int chainLength = currIndex + 1;
    X509Certificate[] newChain = ((chainLength == chain.length) ? chain : Arrays.copyOf(chain, chainLength));
    // 3. If no TrustAnchor was found in cleanup, look for one now
    if (trustAnchors.isEmpty()) {
        TrustAnchor trustAnchor = findTrustAnchorByIssuerAndSignature(newChain[chainLength - 1]);
        if (trustAnchor != null) {
            trustAnchors.add(trustAnchor);
        }
    }
    return newChain;
}