Examples with CoreAuthenticator com.webauthn4j.authenticator.CoreAuthenticator used on opensource projects

Example 1 with CoreAuthenticator

use of com.webauthn4j.authenticator.CoreAuthenticator in project webauthn4j by webauthn4j.

the class DCAssertionDataValidator method createCoreAuthenticationObject.

@Override
@NonNull
protected CoreAuthenticationObject createCoreAuthenticationObject(@NonNull CoreAuthenticationData authenticationData, @NonNull CoreAuthenticationParameters authenticationParameters) {
    AssertUtil.notNull(authenticationData, "authenticationData must not be null");
    AssertUtil.notNull(authenticationData, "authenticationParameters must not be null");
    byte[] credentialId = authenticationData.getCredentialId();
    AuthenticatorData<AuthenticationExtensionAuthenticatorOutput> authenticatorData = authenticationData.getAuthenticatorData();
    byte[] authenticatorDataBytes = authenticationData.getAuthenticatorDataBytes();
    byte[] clientDataHash = authenticationData.getClientDataHash();
    CoreServerProperty serverProperty = authenticationParameters.getServerProperty();
    CoreAuthenticator authenticator = authenticationParameters.getAuthenticator();
    DCAppleDevice dcAppleDevice = new DCAppleDeviceImpl(authenticator.getAttestedCredentialData(), authenticator.getAttestationStatement(), authenticator.getCounter(), authenticator.getAuthenticatorExtensions());
    // noinspection ConstantConditions null check is already done in caller
    return new DCAuthenticationObject(credentialId, authenticatorData, authenticatorDataBytes, clientDataHash, serverProperty, dcAppleDevice);
}

Example 2 with CoreAuthenticator

use of com.webauthn4j.authenticator.CoreAuthenticator in project webauthn4j by webauthn4j.

the class CoreAuthenticationDataValidator method createCoreAuthenticationObject.

@NonNull
protected CoreAuthenticationObject createCoreAuthenticationObject(@NonNull CoreAuthenticationData authenticationData, @NonNull CoreAuthenticationParameters authenticationParameters) {
    byte[] credentialId = authenticationData.getCredentialId();
    AuthenticatorData<AuthenticationExtensionAuthenticatorOutput> authenticatorData = authenticationData.getAuthenticatorData();
    byte[] authenticatorDataBytes = authenticationData.getAuthenticatorDataBytes();
    byte[] clientDataHash = authenticationData.getClientDataHash();
    CoreServerProperty serverProperty = authenticationParameters.getServerProperty();
    CoreAuthenticator authenticator = authenticationParameters.getAuthenticator();
    AssertUtil.notNull(authenticatorData, "authenticatorData must not be null");
    return new CoreAuthenticationObject(credentialId, authenticatorData, authenticatorDataBytes, clientDataHash, serverProperty, authenticator);
}

Example 3 with CoreAuthenticator

use of com.webauthn4j.authenticator.CoreAuthenticator in project webauthn4j by webauthn4j.

the class CoreAuthenticationDataValidator method validate.

/**
 * It is up to caller responsibility to inject challenge into clientData and validate it equals to challenge stored in server side
 *
 * @param authenticationData       authentication data
 * @param authenticationParameters authentication parameters
 */
// as null check is done by BeanAssertUtil#validate
@SuppressWarnings("ConstantConditions")
public void validate(@NonNull CoreAuthenticationData authenticationData, @NonNull CoreAuthenticationParameters authenticationParameters) {
    BeanAssertUtil.validate(authenticationData);
    AssertUtil.notNull(authenticationParameters, "authenticationParameters must not be null");
    // spec| Step1
    // spec| Let options be a new PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions structure configured to the Relying Party's needs for the ceremony.
    // (This step is done on client slide and out of WebAuthn4J responsibility.)
    // spec| Step2
    // spec| Call navigator.credentials.get() and pass options as the publicKey option. Let credential be the result of the successfully resolved promise.
    // spec| If the promise is rejected, abort the ceremony with a user-visible error, or otherwise guide the user experience as might be determinable
    // spec| from the context available in the rejected promise. For information on different error contexts and the circumstances leading to them,
    // spec| see § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation.
    // (This step is done on client slide and out of WebAuthn4J responsibility.)
    // spec| Step3
    // spec| Let response be credential.response. If response is not an instance of AuthenticatorAssertionResponse, abort the ceremony with a user-visible error.
    // (This step is done on client slide and out of WebAuthn4J responsibility.)
    // spec| Step4
    // spec| Let clientExtensionResults be the result of calling credential.getClientExtensionResults().
    // (This step is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    // spec| Step5
    // spec| If options.allowCredentials is not empty, verify that credential.id identifies one of the public key credentials listed in options.allowCredentials.
    byte[] credentialId = authenticationData.getCredentialId();
    List<byte[]> allowCredentials = authenticationParameters.getAllowCredentials();
    validateCredentialId(credentialId, allowCredentials);
    // spec| Step6
    // spec| Identify the user being authenticated and verify that this user is the owner of the public key credential source credentialSource identified by credential.id:
    // spec| - If the user was identified before the authentication ceremony was initiated,
    // spec|   verify that the identified user is the owner of credentialSource. If credential.response.userHandle is present,
    // spec|   let userHandle be its value. Verify that userHandle also maps to the same user.
    // spec| - If the user was not identified before the authentication ceremony was initiated,
    // spec|   verify that response.userHandle is present, and that the user identified by this value is the owner of credentialSource.
    // (This step is out of WebAuthn4J scope. It's caller's responsibility.)
    // spec| Step7
    // spec| Using credential’s id attribute (or the corresponding rawId, if base64url encoding is inappropriate for your use case),
    // spec| look up the corresponding credential public key and let credentialPublicKey be that credential public key.
    // (This step is out of WebAuthn4J scope. It's caller's responsibility.)
    // spec| Step8
    // spec| Let cData, aData and sig denote the value of credential’s response's clientDataJSON, authenticatorData,
    // spec| and signature respectively.
    // (This step is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    // spec| Step9
    // spec| Let JSONtext be the result of running UTF-8 decode on the value of cData.
    // (This step is done on caller.)
    // spec| Step10
    // spec| Let C, the client data claimed as used for the signature, be the result of running an implementation-specific JSON parser on JSONtext.
    // (This step is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    AuthenticatorData<AuthenticationExtensionAuthenticatorOutput> authenticatorData = authenticationData.getAuthenticatorData();
    CoreServerProperty serverProperty = authenticationParameters.getServerProperty();
    BeanAssertUtil.validate(authenticatorData);
    validateAuthenticatorData(authenticatorData);
    CoreAuthenticator authenticator = authenticationParameters.getAuthenticator();
    CoreAuthenticationObject authenticationObject = createCoreAuthenticationObject(authenticationData, authenticationParameters);
    // spec| Step11
    // spec| Verify that the value of C.type is the string webauthn.get.
    // (This step is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    // spec| Step12
    // spec| Verify that the value of C.challenge matches the challenge that was sent to the authenticator in
    // spec| the PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions passed to the get() call.
    // (This step is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    // spec| Step13
    // spec| Verify that the value of C.origin matches the Relying Party's origin.
    // (This step is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    // Verify cross origin, which is not defined in the spec
    // (This step is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    // spec| Step14
    // spec| Verify that the value of C.tokenBinding.status matches the state of Token Binding for the TLS connection over
    // spec| which the attestation was obtained. If Token Binding was used on that TLS connection,
    // spec| also verify that C.tokenBinding.id matches the base64url encoding of the Token Binding ID for the connection.
    // (This step is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    // spec| Step15
    // spec| Verify that the rpIdHash in authData is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the Relying Party.
    rpIdHashValidator.validate(authenticatorData.getRpIdHash(), serverProperty);
    // spec| Verify that the User Present bit of the flags in authData is set.
    if (authenticationParameters.isUserPresenceRequired() && !authenticatorData.isFlagUP()) {
        throw new UserNotPresentException("Validator is configured to check user present, but UP flag in authenticatorData is not set.");
    }
    // spec| If user verification is required for this assertion, verify that the User Verified bit of the flags in authData is set.
    if (authenticationParameters.isUserVerificationRequired() && !authenticatorData.isFlagUV()) {
        throw new UserNotVerifiedException("Validator is configured to check user verified, but UV flag in authenticatorData is not set.");
    }
    // spec| Step18
    // spec| Verify that the values of the client extension outputs in clientExtensionResults and the authenticator
    // spec| extension outputs in the extensions in authData are as expected, considering the client extension input
    // spec| values that were given as the extensions option in the get() call. In particular, any extension identifier
    // spec| values in the clientExtensionResults and the extensions in authData MUST be also be present as extension
    // spec| identifier values in the extensions member of options, i.e., no extensions are present that were not requested.
    // spec| In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the Relying Party and which extensions are in use.
    AuthenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorOutputs<AuthenticationExtensionAuthenticatorOutput> authenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorOutputs = authenticatorData.getExtensions();
    // (This clientExtensionResults verification is only applicable to WebAuthn)
    authenticatorExtensionValidator.validate(authenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorOutputs);
    // spec| Step19
    // spec| Let hash be the result of computing a hash over the cData using SHA-256.
    // spec| Step20
    // spec| Using the credential public key, validate that sig is a valid signature over
    // spec| the binary concatenation of the authenticatorData and the hash of the collectedClientData.
    assertionSignatureValidator.validate(authenticationData, authenticator.getAttestedCredentialData().getCOSEKey());
    // spec| Step21
    // spec| Let storedSignCount be the stored signature counter value associated with credential.id.
    // spec| If authData.signCount is nonzero or storedSignCount is nonzero, then run the following sub-step:
    long presentedSignCount = authenticatorData.getSignCount();
    long storedSignCount = authenticator.getCounter();
    if (presentedSignCount > 0 || storedSignCount > 0) {
        // spec| greater than storedSignCount:
        if (presentedSignCount > storedSignCount) {
            // spec| Update storedSignCount to be the value of authData.signCount.
            // (caller need to update the signature counter value based on the value set in the Authenticator instance)
            authenticator.setCounter(presentedSignCount);
        } else // spec| less than or equal to storedSignCount:
        // spec| This is a signal that the authenticator may be cloned, i.e. at least two copies of the credential private key may exist and are being used in parallel.
        // spec| Relying Parties should incorporate this information into their risk scoring.
        // spec| Whether the Relying Party updates storedSignCount in this case, or not, or fails the authentication ceremony or not, is Relying Party-specific.
        {
            coreMaliciousCounterValueHandler.maliciousCounterValueDetected(authenticationObject);
        }
    }
    for (CustomCoreAuthenticationValidator customAuthenticationValidator : customAuthenticationValidators) {
        customAuthenticationValidator.validate(authenticationObject);
    }
// spec| Step18
// spec| If all the above steps are successful, continue with the authentication ceremony as appropriate. Otherwise, fail the authentication ceremony.
}