Examples with RandomAccessFile java.io.RandomAccessFile used on opensource projects

Example 46 with RandomAccessFile

use of java.io.RandomAccessFile in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.

the class LockSettingsService method checkPassword.

@Override
public boolean checkPassword(byte[] hash, int userId) throws RemoteException {
    checkPasswordReadPermission(userId);
    try {
        // Read all the bytes from the file
        RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(getLockPasswordFilename(userId), "r");
        final byte[] stored = new byte[(int) raf.length()];
        int got = raf.read(stored, 0, stored.length);
        raf.close();
        if (got <= 0) {
            return true;
        }
        // Compare the hash from the file with the entered password's hash
        return Arrays.equals(stored, hash);
    } catch (FileNotFoundException fnfe) {
        Slog.e(TAG, "Cannot read file " + fnfe);
        return true;
    } catch (IOException ioe) {
        Slog.e(TAG, "Cannot read file " + ioe);
        return true;
    }
}

Example 47 with RandomAccessFile

use of java.io.RandomAccessFile in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.

the class LockSettingsService method writeFile.

private void writeFile(String name, byte[] hash) {
    try {
        // Write the hash to file
        RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(name, "rw");
        // Truncate the file if pattern is null, to clear the lock
        if (hash == null || hash.length == 0) {
            raf.setLength(0);
        } else {
            raf.write(hash, 0, hash.length);
        }
        raf.close();
    } catch (IOException ioe) {
        Slog.e(TAG, "Error writing to file " + ioe);
    }
}

Example 48 with RandomAccessFile

use of java.io.RandomAccessFile in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.

the class HugeAgent method onBackup.

/**
     * The set of data backed up by this application is very small: just
     * two booleans and an integer.  With such a simple dataset, it's
     * easiest to simply store a copy of the backed-up data as the state
     * blob describing the last dataset backed up.  The state file
     * contents can be anything; it is private to the agent class, and
     * is never stored off-device.
     *
     * <p>One thing that an application may wish to do is tag the state
     * blob contents with a version number.  This is so that if the
     * application is upgraded, the next time it attempts to do a backup,
     * it can detect that the last backup operation was performed by an
     * older version of the agent, and might therefore require different
     * handling.
     */
@Override
public void onBackup(ParcelFileDescriptor oldState, BackupDataOutput data, ParcelFileDescriptor newState) throws IOException {
    // backup operation.
    synchronized (HugeBackupActivity.sDataLock) {
        RandomAccessFile file = new RandomAccessFile(mDataFile, "r");
        mFilling = file.readInt();
        mAddMayo = file.readBoolean();
        mAddTomato = file.readBoolean();
    }
    // If the new state file descriptor is null, this is the first time
    // a backup is being performed, so we know we have to write the
    // data.  If there <em>is</em> a previous state blob, we want to
    // double check whether the current data is actually different from
    // our last backup, so that we can avoid transmitting redundant
    // data to the storage backend.
    boolean doBackup = (oldState == null);
    if (!doBackup) {
        doBackup = compareStateFile(oldState);
    }
    // transport under the single key string.
    if (doBackup) {
        ByteArrayOutputStream bufStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        // We use a DataOutputStream to write structured data into
        // the buffering stream
        DataOutputStream outWriter = new DataOutputStream(bufStream);
        outWriter.writeInt(mFilling);
        outWriter.writeBoolean(mAddMayo);
        outWriter.writeBoolean(mAddTomato);
        // Okay, we've flattened the data for transmission.  Pull it
        // out of the buffering stream object and send it off.
        byte[] buffer = bufStream.toByteArray();
        int len = buffer.length;
        data.writeEntityHeader(APP_DATA_KEY, len);
        data.writeEntityData(buffer, len);
        // ***** pathological behavior *****
        // Now, in order to incur deliberate too-much-data failures,
        // try to back up 20 MB of data besides what we already pushed.
        final int MEGABYTE = 1024 * 1024;
        final int NUM_MEGS = 20;
        buffer = new byte[MEGABYTE];
        data.writeEntityHeader(HUGE_DATA_KEY, NUM_MEGS * MEGABYTE);
        for (int i = 0; i < NUM_MEGS; i++) {
            data.writeEntityData(buffer, MEGABYTE);
        }
    }
    // Finally, in all cases, we need to write the new state blob
    writeStateFile(newState);
}

Example 49 with RandomAccessFile

use of java.io.RandomAccessFile in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.

the class HugeBackupActivity method recordNewUIState.

/**
     * Another helper; this one reads the current UI state and writes that
     * to the persistent store, then tells the backup manager that we need
     * a backup.
     */
void recordNewUIState() {
    boolean addMayo = mAddMayoCheckbox.isChecked();
    boolean addTomato = mAddTomatoCheckbox.isChecked();
    int whichFilling = mFillingGroup.getCheckedRadioButtonId();
    try {
        synchronized (HugeBackupActivity.sDataLock) {
            RandomAccessFile file = new RandomAccessFile(mDataFile, "rw");
            writeDataToFileLocked(file, addMayo, addTomato, whichFilling);
        }
    } catch (IOException e) {
        Log.e(TAG, "Unable to record new UI state");
    }
    mBackupManager.dataChanged();
}

Example 50 with RandomAccessFile

use of java.io.RandomAccessFile in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.

the class RecoverySystem method verifyPackage.

/**
     * Verify the cryptographic signature of a system update package
     * before installing it.  Note that the package is also verified
     * separately by the installer once the device is rebooted into
     * the recovery system.  This function will return only if the
     * package was successfully verified; otherwise it will throw an
     * exception.
     *
     * Verification of a package can take significant time, so this
     * function should not be called from a UI thread.  Interrupting
     * the thread while this function is in progress will result in a
     * SecurityException being thrown (and the thread's interrupt flag
     * will be cleared).
     *
     * @param packageFile  the package to be verified
     * @param listener     an object to receive periodic progress
     * updates as verification proceeds.  May be null.
     * @param deviceCertsZipFile  the zip file of certificates whose
     * public keys we will accept.  Verification succeeds if the
     * package is signed by the private key corresponding to any
     * public key in this file.  May be null to use the system default
     * file (currently "/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip").
     *
     * @throws IOException if there were any errors reading the
     * package or certs files.
     * @throws GeneralSecurityException if verification failed
     */
public static void verifyPackage(File packageFile, ProgressListener listener, File deviceCertsZipFile) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
    long fileLen = packageFile.length();
    RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(packageFile, "r");
    try {
        int lastPercent = 0;
        long lastPublishTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
        if (listener != null) {
            listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
        }
        raf.seek(fileLen - 6);
        byte[] footer = new byte[6];
        raf.readFully(footer);
        if (footer[2] != (byte) 0xff || footer[3] != (byte) 0xff) {
            throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (no footer)");
        }
        int commentSize = (footer[4] & 0xff) | ((footer[5] & 0xff) << 8);
        int signatureStart = (footer[0] & 0xff) | ((footer[1] & 0xff) << 8);
        byte[] eocd = new byte[commentSize + 22];
        raf.seek(fileLen - (commentSize + 22));
        raf.readFully(eocd);
        // end-of-central-directory record.
        if (eocd[0] != (byte) 0x50 || eocd[1] != (byte) 0x4b || eocd[2] != (byte) 0x05 || eocd[3] != (byte) 0x06) {
            throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (bad footer)");
        }
        for (int i = 4; i < eocd.length - 3; ++i) {
            if (eocd[i] == (byte) 0x50 && eocd[i + 1] == (byte) 0x4b && eocd[i + 2] == (byte) 0x05 && eocd[i + 3] == (byte) 0x06) {
                throw new SignatureException("EOCD marker found after start of EOCD");
            }
        }
        // The following code is largely copied from
        // JarUtils.verifySignature().  We could just *call* that
        // method here if that function didn't read the entire
        // input (ie, the whole OTA package) into memory just to
        // compute its message digest.
        BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(eocd, commentSize + 22 - signatureStart, signatureStart));
        ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
        SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
        if (signedData == null) {
            throw new IOException("signedData is null");
        }
        Collection encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
        if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
            throw new IOException("encCerts is empty");
        }
        // Take the first certificate from the signature (packages
        // should contain only one).
        Iterator it = encCerts.iterator();
        X509Certificate cert = null;
        if (it.hasNext()) {
            cert = new X509CertImpl((org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate) it.next());
        } else {
            throw new SignatureException("signature contains no certificates");
        }
        List sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
        SignerInfo sigInfo;
        if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
            sigInfo = (SignerInfo) sigInfos.get(0);
        } else {
            throw new IOException("no signer infos!");
        }
        // Check that the public key of the certificate contained
        // in the package equals one of our trusted public keys.
        HashSet<Certificate> trusted = getTrustedCerts(deviceCertsZipFile == null ? DEFAULT_KEYSTORE : deviceCertsZipFile);
        PublicKey signatureKey = cert.getPublicKey();
        boolean verified = false;
        for (Certificate c : trusted) {
            if (c.getPublicKey().equals(signatureKey)) {
                verified = true;
                break;
            }
        }
        if (!verified) {
            throw new SignatureException("signature doesn't match any trusted key");
        }
        // The signature cert matches a trusted key.  Now verify that
        // the digest in the cert matches the actual file data.
        // The verifier in recovery *only* handles SHA1withRSA
        // signatures.  SignApk.java always uses SHA1withRSA, no
        // matter what the cert says to use.  Ignore
        // cert.getSigAlgName(), and instead use whatever
        // algorithm is used by the signature (which should be
        // SHA1withRSA).
        String da = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
        String dea = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
        String alg = null;
        if (da == null || dea == null) {
            // fall back to the cert algorithm if the sig one
            // doesn't look right.
            alg = cert.getSigAlgName();
        } else {
            alg = da + "with" + dea;
        }
        Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
        sig.initVerify(cert);
        // The signature covers all of the OTA package except the
        // archive comment and its 2-byte length.
        long toRead = fileLen - commentSize - 2;
        long soFar = 0;
        raf.seek(0);
        byte[] buffer = new byte[4096];
        boolean interrupted = false;
        while (soFar < toRead) {
            interrupted = Thread.interrupted();
            if (interrupted)
                break;
            int size = buffer.length;
            if (soFar + size > toRead) {
                size = (int) (toRead - soFar);
            }
            int read = raf.read(buffer, 0, size);
            sig.update(buffer, 0, read);
            soFar += read;
            if (listener != null) {
                long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
                int p = (int) (soFar * 100 / toRead);
                if (p > lastPercent && now - lastPublishTime > PUBLISH_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS) {
                    lastPercent = p;
                    lastPublishTime = now;
                    listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
                }
            }
        }
        if (listener != null) {
            listener.onProgress(100);
        }
        if (interrupted) {
            throw new SignatureException("verification was interrupted");
        }
        if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
            throw new SignatureException("signature digest verification failed");
        }
    } finally {
        raf.close();
    }
}