use of org.apache.harmony.security.pkcs7.SignerInfo in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class RecoverySystem method verifyPackage.
/**
* Verify the cryptographic signature of a system update package
* before installing it. Note that the package is also verified
* separately by the installer once the device is rebooted into
* the recovery system. This function will return only if the
* package was successfully verified; otherwise it will throw an
* exception.
*
* Verification of a package can take significant time, so this
* function should not be called from a UI thread. Interrupting
* the thread while this function is in progress will result in a
* SecurityException being thrown (and the thread's interrupt flag
* will be cleared).
*
* @param packageFile the package to be verified
* @param listener an object to receive periodic progress
* updates as verification proceeds. May be null.
* @param deviceCertsZipFile the zip file of certificates whose
* public keys we will accept. Verification succeeds if the
* package is signed by the private key corresponding to any
* public key in this file. May be null to use the system default
* file (currently "/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip").
*
* @throws IOException if there were any errors reading the
* package or certs files.
* @throws GeneralSecurityException if verification failed
*/
public static void verifyPackage(File packageFile, ProgressListener listener, File deviceCertsZipFile) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
long fileLen = packageFile.length();
RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(packageFile, "r");
try {
int lastPercent = 0;
long lastPublishTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
raf.seek(fileLen - 6);
byte[] footer = new byte[6];
raf.readFully(footer);
if (footer[2] != (byte) 0xff || footer[3] != (byte) 0xff) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (no footer)");
}
int commentSize = (footer[4] & 0xff) | ((footer[5] & 0xff) << 8);
int signatureStart = (footer[0] & 0xff) | ((footer[1] & 0xff) << 8);
byte[] eocd = new byte[commentSize + 22];
raf.seek(fileLen - (commentSize + 22));
raf.readFully(eocd);
// end-of-central-directory record.
if (eocd[0] != (byte) 0x50 || eocd[1] != (byte) 0x4b || eocd[2] != (byte) 0x05 || eocd[3] != (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (bad footer)");
}
for (int i = 4; i < eocd.length - 3; ++i) {
if (eocd[i] == (byte) 0x50 && eocd[i + 1] == (byte) 0x4b && eocd[i + 2] == (byte) 0x05 && eocd[i + 3] == (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("EOCD marker found after start of EOCD");
}
}
// The following code is largely copied from
// JarUtils.verifySignature(). We could just *call* that
// method here if that function didn't read the entire
// input (ie, the whole OTA package) into memory just to
// compute its message digest.
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(eocd, commentSize + 22 - signatureStart, signatureStart));
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("signedData is null");
}
Collection encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
throw new IOException("encCerts is empty");
}
// Take the first certificate from the signature (packages
// should contain only one).
Iterator it = encCerts.iterator();
X509Certificate cert = null;
if (it.hasNext()) {
cert = new X509CertImpl((org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate) it.next());
} else {
throw new SignatureException("signature contains no certificates");
}
List sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = (SignerInfo) sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
throw new IOException("no signer infos!");
}
// Check that the public key of the certificate contained
// in the package equals one of our trusted public keys.
HashSet<Certificate> trusted = getTrustedCerts(deviceCertsZipFile == null ? DEFAULT_KEYSTORE : deviceCertsZipFile);
PublicKey signatureKey = cert.getPublicKey();
boolean verified = false;
for (Certificate c : trusted) {
if (c.getPublicKey().equals(signatureKey)) {
verified = true;
break;
}
}
if (!verified) {
throw new SignatureException("signature doesn't match any trusted key");
}
// The signature cert matches a trusted key. Now verify that
// the digest in the cert matches the actual file data.
// The verifier in recovery *only* handles SHA1withRSA
// signatures. SignApk.java always uses SHA1withRSA, no
// matter what the cert says to use. Ignore
// cert.getSigAlgName(), and instead use whatever
// algorithm is used by the signature (which should be
// SHA1withRSA).
String da = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
String dea = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
String alg = null;
if (da == null || dea == null) {
// fall back to the cert algorithm if the sig one
// doesn't look right.
alg = cert.getSigAlgName();
} else {
alg = da + "with" + dea;
}
Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
sig.initVerify(cert);
// The signature covers all of the OTA package except the
// archive comment and its 2-byte length.
long toRead = fileLen - commentSize - 2;
long soFar = 0;
raf.seek(0);
byte[] buffer = new byte[4096];
boolean interrupted = false;
while (soFar < toRead) {
interrupted = Thread.interrupted();
if (interrupted)
break;
int size = buffer.length;
if (soFar + size > toRead) {
size = (int) (toRead - soFar);
}
int read = raf.read(buffer, 0, size);
sig.update(buffer, 0, read);
soFar += read;
if (listener != null) {
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
int p = (int) (soFar * 100 / toRead);
if (p > lastPercent && now - lastPublishTime > PUBLISH_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS) {
lastPercent = p;
lastPublishTime = now;
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
}
}
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(100);
}
if (interrupted) {
throw new SignatureException("verification was interrupted");
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SignatureException("signature digest verification failed");
}
} finally {
raf.close();
}
}
use of org.apache.harmony.security.pkcs7.SignerInfo in project XobotOS by xamarin.
the class RecoverySystem method verifyPackage.
/**
* Verify the cryptographic signature of a system update package
* before installing it. Note that the package is also verified
* separately by the installer once the device is rebooted into
* the recovery system. This function will return only if the
* package was successfully verified; otherwise it will throw an
* exception.
*
* Verification of a package can take significant time, so this
* function should not be called from a UI thread. Interrupting
* the thread while this function is in progress will result in a
* SecurityException being thrown (and the thread's interrupt flag
* will be cleared).
*
* @param packageFile the package to be verified
* @param listener an object to receive periodic progress
* updates as verification proceeds. May be null.
* @param deviceCertsZipFile the zip file of certificates whose
* public keys we will accept. Verification succeeds if the
* package is signed by the private key corresponding to any
* public key in this file. May be null to use the system default
* file (currently "/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip").
*
* @throws IOException if there were any errors reading the
* package or certs files.
* @throws GeneralSecurityException if verification failed
*/
public static void verifyPackage(File packageFile, ProgressListener listener, File deviceCertsZipFile) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
long fileLen = packageFile.length();
RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(packageFile, "r");
try {
int lastPercent = 0;
long lastPublishTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
raf.seek(fileLen - 6);
byte[] footer = new byte[6];
raf.readFully(footer);
if (footer[2] != (byte) 0xff || footer[3] != (byte) 0xff) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (no footer)");
}
int commentSize = (footer[4] & 0xff) | ((footer[5] & 0xff) << 8);
int signatureStart = (footer[0] & 0xff) | ((footer[1] & 0xff) << 8);
Log.v(TAG, String.format("comment size %d; signature start %d", commentSize, signatureStart));
byte[] eocd = new byte[commentSize + 22];
raf.seek(fileLen - (commentSize + 22));
raf.readFully(eocd);
// end-of-central-directory record.
if (eocd[0] != (byte) 0x50 || eocd[1] != (byte) 0x4b || eocd[2] != (byte) 0x05 || eocd[3] != (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (bad footer)");
}
for (int i = 4; i < eocd.length - 3; ++i) {
if (eocd[i] == (byte) 0x50 && eocd[i + 1] == (byte) 0x4b && eocd[i + 2] == (byte) 0x05 && eocd[i + 3] == (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("EOCD marker found after start of EOCD");
}
}
// The following code is largely copied from
// JarUtils.verifySignature(). We could just *call* that
// method here if that function didn't read the entire
// input (ie, the whole OTA package) into memory just to
// compute its message digest.
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(eocd, commentSize + 22 - signatureStart, signatureStart));
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("signedData is null");
}
Collection encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
throw new IOException("encCerts is empty");
}
// Take the first certificate from the signature (packages
// should contain only one).
Iterator it = encCerts.iterator();
X509Certificate cert = null;
if (it.hasNext()) {
cert = new X509CertImpl((org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate) it.next());
} else {
throw new SignatureException("signature contains no certificates");
}
List sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = (SignerInfo) sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
throw new IOException("no signer infos!");
}
// Check that the public key of the certificate contained
// in the package equals one of our trusted public keys.
HashSet<Certificate> trusted = getTrustedCerts(deviceCertsZipFile == null ? DEFAULT_KEYSTORE : deviceCertsZipFile);
PublicKey signatureKey = cert.getPublicKey();
boolean verified = false;
for (Certificate c : trusted) {
if (c.getPublicKey().equals(signatureKey)) {
verified = true;
break;
}
}
if (!verified) {
throw new SignatureException("signature doesn't match any trusted key");
}
// The signature cert matches a trusted key. Now verify that
// the digest in the cert matches the actual file data.
// The verifier in recovery *only* handles SHA1withRSA
// signatures. SignApk.java always uses SHA1withRSA, no
// matter what the cert says to use. Ignore
// cert.getSigAlgName(), and instead use whatever
// algorithm is used by the signature (which should be
// SHA1withRSA).
String da = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
String dea = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
String alg = null;
if (da == null || dea == null) {
// fall back to the cert algorithm if the sig one
// doesn't look right.
alg = cert.getSigAlgName();
} else {
alg = da + "with" + dea;
}
Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
sig.initVerify(cert);
// The signature covers all of the OTA package except the
// archive comment and its 2-byte length.
long toRead = fileLen - commentSize - 2;
long soFar = 0;
raf.seek(0);
byte[] buffer = new byte[4096];
boolean interrupted = false;
while (soFar < toRead) {
interrupted = Thread.interrupted();
if (interrupted)
break;
int size = buffer.length;
if (soFar + size > toRead) {
size = (int) (toRead - soFar);
}
int read = raf.read(buffer, 0, size);
sig.update(buffer, 0, read);
soFar += read;
if (listener != null) {
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
int p = (int) (soFar * 100 / toRead);
if (p > lastPercent && now - lastPublishTime > PUBLISH_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS) {
lastPercent = p;
lastPublishTime = now;
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
}
}
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(100);
}
if (interrupted) {
throw new SignatureException("verification was interrupted");
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SignatureException("signature digest verification failed");
}
} finally {
raf.close();
}
}
use of org.apache.harmony.security.pkcs7.SignerInfo in project j2objc by google.
the class JarUtils method verifySignature.
/**
* This method handle all the work with PKCS7, ASN1 encoding, signature verifying,
* and certification path building.
* See also PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard:
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2315.txt
* @param signature - the input stream of signature file to be verified
* @param signatureBlock - the input stream of corresponding signature block file
* @return array of certificates used to verify the signature file
* @throws IOException - if some errors occurs during reading from the stream
* @throws GeneralSecurityException - if signature verification process fails
*/
public static Certificate[] verifySignature(InputStream signature, InputStream signatureBlock) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(signatureBlock);
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("No SignedData found");
}
Collection<org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate> encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
return null;
}
X509Certificate[] certs = new X509Certificate[encCerts.size()];
CertificateFactory cf = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509");
int i = 0;
for (org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate encCert : encCerts) {
final byte[] encoded = encCert.getEncoded();
final InputStream is = new ByteArrayInputStream(encoded);
certs[i++] = new VerbatimX509Certificate((X509Certificate) cf.generateCertificate(is), encoded);
}
List<SignerInfo> sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
return null;
}
// Issuer
X500Principal issuer = sigInfo.getIssuer();
// Certificate serial number
BigInteger snum = sigInfo.getSerialNumber();
// Locate the certificate
int issuerSertIndex = 0;
for (i = 0; i < certs.length; i++) {
if (issuer.equals(certs[i].getIssuerDN()) && snum.equals(certs[i].getSerialNumber())) {
issuerSertIndex = i;
break;
}
}
if (i == certs.length) {
// No issuer certificate found
return null;
}
if (certs[issuerSertIndex].hasUnsupportedCriticalExtension()) {
throw new SecurityException("Can not recognize a critical extension");
}
// Get Signature instance
final String daOid = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
final String daName = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithmName();
final String deaOid = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
final String deaName = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithmName();
String alg = null;
Signature sig = null;
if (daOid != null && deaOid != null) {
alg = daOid + "with" + deaOid;
try {
sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
// Try to convert to names instead of OID.
if (sig == null && daName != null && deaName != null) {
alg = daName + "with" + deaName;
try {
sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
}
}
if (sig == null && deaOid != null) {
alg = deaOid;
try {
sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
if (sig == null) {
alg = deaName;
try {
sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
}
}
// We couldn't find a valid Signature type.
if (sig == null) {
return null;
}
sig.initVerify(certs[issuerSertIndex]);
// If the authenticatedAttributes field of SignerInfo contains more than zero attributes,
// compute the message digest on the ASN.1 DER encoding of the Attributes value.
// Otherwise, compute the message digest on the data.
List<AttributeTypeAndValue> atr = sigInfo.getAuthenticatedAttributes();
byte[] sfBytes = new byte[signature.available()];
signature.read(sfBytes);
if (atr == null) {
sig.update(sfBytes);
} else {
sig.update(sigInfo.getEncodedAuthenticatedAttributes());
// If the authenticatedAttributes field contains the message-digest attribute,
// verify that it equals the computed digest of the signature file
byte[] existingDigest = null;
for (AttributeTypeAndValue a : atr) {
if (Arrays.equals(a.getType().getOid(), MESSAGE_DIGEST_OID)) {
if (existingDigest != null) {
throw new SecurityException("Too many MessageDigest attributes");
}
Collection<?> entries = a.getValue().getValues(ASN1OctetString.getInstance());
if (entries.size() != 1) {
throw new SecurityException("Too many values for MessageDigest attribute");
}
existingDigest = (byte[]) entries.iterator().next();
}
}
// must have a message-digest attribute.
if (existingDigest == null) {
throw new SecurityException("Missing MessageDigest in Authenticated Attributes");
}
MessageDigest md = null;
if (daOid != null) {
md = MessageDigest.getInstance(daOid);
}
if (md == null && daName != null) {
md = MessageDigest.getInstance(daName);
}
if (md == null) {
return null;
}
byte[] computedDigest = md.digest(sfBytes);
if (!Arrays.equals(existingDigest, computedDigest)) {
throw new SecurityException("Incorrect MD");
}
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SecurityException("Incorrect signature");
}
return createChain(certs[issuerSertIndex], certs);
}
use of org.apache.harmony.security.pkcs7.SignerInfo in project robovm by robovm.
the class JarUtils method verifySignature.
/**
* This method handle all the work with PKCS7, ASN1 encoding, signature verifying,
* and certification path building.
* See also PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard:
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2315.txt
* @param signature - the input stream of signature file to be verified
* @param signatureBlock - the input stream of corresponding signature block file
* @return array of certificates used to verify the signature file
* @throws IOException - if some errors occurs during reading from the stream
* @throws GeneralSecurityException - if signature verification process fails
*/
public static Certificate[] verifySignature(InputStream signature, InputStream signatureBlock) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(signatureBlock);
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("No SignedData found");
}
Collection<org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate> encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
return null;
}
X509Certificate[] certs = new X509Certificate[encCerts.size()];
int i = 0;
for (org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate encCert : encCerts) {
certs[i++] = new X509CertImpl(encCert);
}
List<SignerInfo> sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
return null;
}
// Issuer
X500Principal issuer = sigInfo.getIssuer();
// Certificate serial number
BigInteger snum = sigInfo.getSerialNumber();
// Locate the certificate
int issuerSertIndex = 0;
for (i = 0; i < certs.length; i++) {
if (issuer.equals(certs[i].getIssuerDN()) && snum.equals(certs[i].getSerialNumber())) {
issuerSertIndex = i;
break;
}
}
if (i == certs.length) {
// No issuer certificate found
return null;
}
if (certs[issuerSertIndex].hasUnsupportedCriticalExtension()) {
throw new SecurityException("Can not recognize a critical extension");
}
// Get Signature instance
final String daOid = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
final String daName = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithmName();
final String deaOid = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
String alg = null;
Signature sig = null;
if (daOid != null && deaOid != null) {
alg = daOid + "with" + deaOid;
try {
sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
// Try to convert to names instead of OID.
if (sig == null) {
final String deaName = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithmName();
alg = daName + "with" + deaName;
try {
sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
}
}
/*
* TODO figure out the case in which we'd only use digestAlgorithm and
* add a test for it.
*/
if (sig == null && daOid != null) {
alg = daOid;
try {
sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
if (sig == null && daName != null) {
alg = daName;
try {
sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
}
}
// We couldn't find a valid Signature type.
if (sig == null) {
return null;
}
sig.initVerify(certs[issuerSertIndex]);
// If the authenticatedAttributes field of SignerInfo contains more than zero attributes,
// compute the message digest on the ASN.1 DER encoding of the Attributes value.
// Otherwise, compute the message digest on the data.
List<AttributeTypeAndValue> atr = sigInfo.getAuthenticatedAttributes();
byte[] sfBytes = new byte[signature.available()];
signature.read(sfBytes);
if (atr == null) {
sig.update(sfBytes);
} else {
sig.update(sigInfo.getEncodedAuthenticatedAttributes());
// If the authenticatedAttributes field contains the message-digest attribute,
// verify that it equals the computed digest of the signature file
byte[] existingDigest = null;
for (AttributeTypeAndValue a : atr) {
if (Arrays.equals(a.getType().getOid(), MESSAGE_DIGEST_OID)) {
if (existingDigest != null) {
throw new SecurityException("Too many MessageDigest attributes");
}
Collection<?> entries = a.getValue().getValues(ASN1OctetString.getInstance());
if (entries.size() != 1) {
throw new SecurityException("Too many values for MessageDigest attribute");
}
existingDigest = (byte[]) entries.iterator().next();
}
}
// message digest entry.
if (existingDigest == null) {
throw new SecurityException("Missing MessageDigest in Authenticated Attributes");
}
MessageDigest md = null;
if (daOid != null) {
md = MessageDigest.getInstance(daOid);
}
if (md == null && daName != null) {
md = MessageDigest.getInstance(daName);
}
if (md == null) {
return null;
}
byte[] computedDigest = md.digest(sfBytes);
if (!Arrays.equals(existingDigest, computedDigest)) {
throw new SecurityException("Incorrect MD");
}
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SecurityException("Incorrect signature");
}
return createChain(certs[issuerSertIndex], certs);
}
use of org.apache.harmony.security.pkcs7.SignerInfo in project XobotOS by xamarin.
the class JarUtils method verifySignature.
/**
* This method handle all the work with PKCS7, ASN1 encoding, signature verifying,
* and certification path building.
* See also PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard:
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2315.txt
* @param signature - the input stream of signature file to be verified
* @param signatureBlock - the input stream of corresponding signature block file
* @return array of certificates used to verify the signature file
* @throws IOException - if some errors occurs during reading from the stream
* @throws GeneralSecurityException - if signature verification process fails
*/
public static Certificate[] verifySignature(InputStream signature, InputStream signatureBlock) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(signatureBlock);
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("No SignedData found");
}
Collection<org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate> encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
return null;
}
X509Certificate[] certs = new X509Certificate[encCerts.size()];
int i = 0;
for (org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate encCert : encCerts) {
certs[i++] = new X509CertImpl(encCert);
}
List<SignerInfo> sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
return null;
}
// Issuer
X500Principal issuer = sigInfo.getIssuer();
// Certificate serial number
BigInteger snum = sigInfo.getSerialNumber();
// Locate the certificate
int issuerSertIndex = 0;
for (i = 0; i < certs.length; i++) {
if (issuer.equals(certs[i].getIssuerDN()) && snum.equals(certs[i].getSerialNumber())) {
issuerSertIndex = i;
break;
}
}
if (i == certs.length) {
// No issuer certificate found
return null;
}
if (certs[issuerSertIndex].hasUnsupportedCriticalExtension()) {
throw new SecurityException("Can not recognize a critical extension");
}
// Get Signature instance
Signature sig = null;
String da = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
String dea = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
String alg = null;
if (da != null && dea != null) {
alg = da + "with" + dea;
try {
sig = OpenSSLSignature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
}
}
if (sig == null) {
alg = da;
if (alg == null) {
return null;
}
try {
sig = OpenSSLSignature.getInstance(alg);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
return null;
}
}
sig.initVerify(certs[issuerSertIndex]);
// If the authenticatedAttributes field of SignerInfo contains more than zero attributes,
// compute the message digest on the ASN.1 DER encoding of the Attributes value.
// Otherwise, compute the message digest on the data.
List<AttributeTypeAndValue> atr = sigInfo.getAuthenticatedAttributes();
byte[] sfBytes = new byte[signature.available()];
signature.read(sfBytes);
if (atr == null) {
sig.update(sfBytes);
} else {
sig.update(sigInfo.getEncodedAuthenticatedAttributes());
// If the authenticatedAttributes field contains the message-digest attribute,
// verify that it equals the computed digest of the signature file
byte[] existingDigest = null;
for (AttributeTypeAndValue a : atr) {
if (Arrays.equals(a.getType().getOid(), MESSAGE_DIGEST_OID)) {
//TODO value existingDigest = a.AttributeValue;
}
}
if (existingDigest != null) {
MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance(sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm());
byte[] computedDigest = md.digest(sfBytes);
if (!Arrays.equals(existingDigest, computedDigest)) {
throw new SecurityException("Incorrect MD");
}
}
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SecurityException("Incorrect signature");
}
return createChain(certs[issuerSertIndex], certs);
}
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