use of java.security.cert.Certificate in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class RecoverySystem method verifyPackage.
/**
* Verify the cryptographic signature of a system update package
* before installing it. Note that the package is also verified
* separately by the installer once the device is rebooted into
* the recovery system. This function will return only if the
* package was successfully verified; otherwise it will throw an
* exception.
*
* Verification of a package can take significant time, so this
* function should not be called from a UI thread. Interrupting
* the thread while this function is in progress will result in a
* SecurityException being thrown (and the thread's interrupt flag
* will be cleared).
*
* @param packageFile the package to be verified
* @param listener an object to receive periodic progress
* updates as verification proceeds. May be null.
* @param deviceCertsZipFile the zip file of certificates whose
* public keys we will accept. Verification succeeds if the
* package is signed by the private key corresponding to any
* public key in this file. May be null to use the system default
* file (currently "/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip").
*
* @throws IOException if there were any errors reading the
* package or certs files.
* @throws GeneralSecurityException if verification failed
*/
public static void verifyPackage(File packageFile, ProgressListener listener, File deviceCertsZipFile) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
long fileLen = packageFile.length();
RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(packageFile, "r");
try {
int lastPercent = 0;
long lastPublishTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
raf.seek(fileLen - 6);
byte[] footer = new byte[6];
raf.readFully(footer);
if (footer[2] != (byte) 0xff || footer[3] != (byte) 0xff) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (no footer)");
}
int commentSize = (footer[4] & 0xff) | ((footer[5] & 0xff) << 8);
int signatureStart = (footer[0] & 0xff) | ((footer[1] & 0xff) << 8);
byte[] eocd = new byte[commentSize + 22];
raf.seek(fileLen - (commentSize + 22));
raf.readFully(eocd);
// end-of-central-directory record.
if (eocd[0] != (byte) 0x50 || eocd[1] != (byte) 0x4b || eocd[2] != (byte) 0x05 || eocd[3] != (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (bad footer)");
}
for (int i = 4; i < eocd.length - 3; ++i) {
if (eocd[i] == (byte) 0x50 && eocd[i + 1] == (byte) 0x4b && eocd[i + 2] == (byte) 0x05 && eocd[i + 3] == (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("EOCD marker found after start of EOCD");
}
}
// The following code is largely copied from
// JarUtils.verifySignature(). We could just *call* that
// method here if that function didn't read the entire
// input (ie, the whole OTA package) into memory just to
// compute its message digest.
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(eocd, commentSize + 22 - signatureStart, signatureStart));
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("signedData is null");
}
Collection encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
throw new IOException("encCerts is empty");
}
// Take the first certificate from the signature (packages
// should contain only one).
Iterator it = encCerts.iterator();
X509Certificate cert = null;
if (it.hasNext()) {
cert = new X509CertImpl((org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate) it.next());
} else {
throw new SignatureException("signature contains no certificates");
}
List sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = (SignerInfo) sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
throw new IOException("no signer infos!");
}
// Check that the public key of the certificate contained
// in the package equals one of our trusted public keys.
HashSet<Certificate> trusted = getTrustedCerts(deviceCertsZipFile == null ? DEFAULT_KEYSTORE : deviceCertsZipFile);
PublicKey signatureKey = cert.getPublicKey();
boolean verified = false;
for (Certificate c : trusted) {
if (c.getPublicKey().equals(signatureKey)) {
verified = true;
break;
}
}
if (!verified) {
throw new SignatureException("signature doesn't match any trusted key");
}
// The signature cert matches a trusted key. Now verify that
// the digest in the cert matches the actual file data.
// The verifier in recovery *only* handles SHA1withRSA
// signatures. SignApk.java always uses SHA1withRSA, no
// matter what the cert says to use. Ignore
// cert.getSigAlgName(), and instead use whatever
// algorithm is used by the signature (which should be
// SHA1withRSA).
String da = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
String dea = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
String alg = null;
if (da == null || dea == null) {
// fall back to the cert algorithm if the sig one
// doesn't look right.
alg = cert.getSigAlgName();
} else {
alg = da + "with" + dea;
}
Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
sig.initVerify(cert);
// The signature covers all of the OTA package except the
// archive comment and its 2-byte length.
long toRead = fileLen - commentSize - 2;
long soFar = 0;
raf.seek(0);
byte[] buffer = new byte[4096];
boolean interrupted = false;
while (soFar < toRead) {
interrupted = Thread.interrupted();
if (interrupted)
break;
int size = buffer.length;
if (soFar + size > toRead) {
size = (int) (toRead - soFar);
}
int read = raf.read(buffer, 0, size);
sig.update(buffer, 0, read);
soFar += read;
if (listener != null) {
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
int p = (int) (soFar * 100 / toRead);
if (p > lastPercent && now - lastPublishTime > PUBLISH_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS) {
lastPercent = p;
lastPublishTime = now;
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
}
}
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(100);
}
if (interrupted) {
throw new SignatureException("verification was interrupted");
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SignatureException("signature digest verification failed");
}
} finally {
raf.close();
}
}
use of java.security.cert.Certificate in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class SslCertificate method restoreState.
/**
* Restores the certificate stored in the bundle
* @param bundle The bundle with the certificate state stored in it
* @return The SSL certificate stored in the bundle or null if fails
*/
public static SslCertificate restoreState(Bundle bundle) {
if (bundle == null) {
return null;
}
X509Certificate x509Certificate;
byte[] bytes = bundle.getByteArray(X509_CERTIFICATE);
if (bytes == null) {
x509Certificate = null;
} else {
try {
CertificateFactory certFactory = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509");
Certificate cert = certFactory.generateCertificate(new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes));
x509Certificate = (X509Certificate) cert;
} catch (CertificateException e) {
x509Certificate = null;
}
}
return new SslCertificate(bundle.getString(ISSUED_TO), bundle.getString(ISSUED_BY), parseDate(bundle.getString(VALID_NOT_BEFORE)), parseDate(bundle.getString(VALID_NOT_AFTER)), x509Certificate);
}
use of java.security.cert.Certificate in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class KeyChain method toCertificate.
private static X509Certificate toCertificate(byte[] bytes) {
if (bytes == null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("bytes == null");
}
try {
CertificateFactory certFactory = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509");
Certificate cert = certFactory.generateCertificate(new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes));
return (X509Certificate) cert;
} catch (CertificateException e) {
throw new AssertionError(e);
}
}
use of java.security.cert.Certificate in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class AndroidKeyStore method engineGetCertificateAlias.
@Override
public String engineGetCertificateAlias(Certificate cert) {
if (cert == null) {
return null;
}
final Set<String> nonCaEntries = new HashSet<String>();
/*
* First scan the PrivateKeyEntry types. The KeyStoreSpi documentation
* says to only compare the first certificate in the chain which is
* equivalent to the USER_CERTIFICATE prefix for the Android keystore
* convention.
*/
final String[] certAliases = mKeyStore.saw(Credentials.USER_CERTIFICATE);
if (certAliases != null) {
for (String alias : certAliases) {
final byte[] certBytes = mKeyStore.get(Credentials.USER_CERTIFICATE + alias);
if (certBytes == null) {
continue;
}
final Certificate c = toCertificate(certBytes);
nonCaEntries.add(alias);
if (cert.equals(c)) {
return alias;
}
}
}
/*
* Look at all the TrustedCertificateEntry types. Skip all the
* PrivateKeyEntry we looked at above.
*/
final String[] caAliases = mKeyStore.saw(Credentials.CA_CERTIFICATE);
if (certAliases != null) {
for (String alias : caAliases) {
if (nonCaEntries.contains(alias)) {
continue;
}
final byte[] certBytes = mKeyStore.get(Credentials.CA_CERTIFICATE + alias);
if (certBytes == null) {
continue;
}
final Certificate c = toCertificate(mKeyStore.get(Credentials.CA_CERTIFICATE + alias));
if (cert.equals(c)) {
return alias;
}
}
}
return null;
}
use of java.security.cert.Certificate in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class Credentials method convertFromPem.
/**
* Convert objects from PEM format, which is used for
* CA_CERTIFICATE and USER_CERTIFICATE entries.
*/
public static List<X509Certificate> convertFromPem(byte[] bytes) throws IOException, CertificateException {
ByteArrayInputStream bai = new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes);
Reader reader = new InputStreamReader(bai, Charsets.US_ASCII);
PemReader pr = new PemReader(reader);
CertificateFactory cf = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X509");
List<X509Certificate> result = new ArrayList<X509Certificate>();
PemObject o;
while ((o = pr.readPemObject()) != null) {
if (o.getType().equals("CERTIFICATE")) {
Certificate c = cf.generateCertificate(new ByteArrayInputStream(o.getContent()));
result.add((X509Certificate) c);
} else {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Unknown type " + o.getType());
}
}
pr.close();
return result;
}
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