use of org.jivesoftware.openfire.sasl.Failure in project Openfire by igniterealtime.
the class SASLAuthentication method handle.
/**
* Handles the SASL authentication packet. The entity may be sending an initial
* authentication request or a response to a challenge made by the server. The returned
* value indicates whether the authentication has finished either successfully or not or
* if the entity is expected to send a response to a challenge.
*
* @param session the session that is authenticating with the server.
* @param doc the stanza sent by the authenticating entity.
* @return value that indicates whether the authentication has finished either successfully
* or not or if the entity is expected to send a response to a challenge.
*/
public static Status handle(LocalSession session, Element doc) {
try {
if (!doc.getNamespaceURI().equals(SASL_NAMESPACE)) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Unexpected data received while negotiating SASL authentication. Name of the offending root element: " + doc.getName() + " Namespace: " + doc.getNamespaceURI());
}
switch(ElementType.valueOfCaseInsensitive(doc.getName())) {
case ABORT:
throw new SaslFailureException(Failure.ABORTED);
case AUTH:
if (doc.attributeValue("mechanism") == null) {
throw new SaslFailureException(Failure.INVALID_MECHANISM, "Peer did not specify a mechanism.");
}
final String mechanismName = doc.attributeValue("mechanism").toUpperCase();
// See if the mechanism is supported by configuration as well as by implementation.
if (!mechanisms.contains(mechanismName)) {
throw new SaslFailureException(Failure.INVALID_MECHANISM, "The configuration of Openfire does not contain or allow the mechanism.");
}
// OF-477: The SASL implementation requires the fully qualified host name (not the domain name!) of this server,
// yet, most of the XMPP implemenations of DIGEST-MD5 will actually use the domain name. To account for that,
// here, we'll use the host name, unless DIGEST-MD5 is being negotiated!
final XMPPServerInfo serverInfo = XMPPServer.getInstance().getServerInfo();
final String serverName = (mechanismName.equals("DIGEST-MD5") ? serverInfo.getXMPPDomain() : serverInfo.getHostname());
// Construct the configuration properties
final Map<String, Object> props = new HashMap<>();
props.put(LocalSession.class.getCanonicalName(), session);
props.put(Sasl.POLICY_NOANONYMOUS, Boolean.toString(!AnonymousSaslServer.ENABLED.getValue()));
props.put("com.sun.security.sasl.digest.realm", serverInfo.getXMPPDomain());
SaslServer saslServer = Sasl.createSaslServer(mechanismName, "xmpp", serverName, props, new XMPPCallbackHandler());
if (saslServer == null) {
throw new SaslFailureException(Failure.INVALID_MECHANISM, "There is no provider that can provide a SASL server for the desired mechanism and properties.");
}
session.setSessionData("SaslServer", saslServer);
if (mechanismName.equals("DIGEST-MD5")) {
// RFC2831 (DIGEST-MD5) says the client MAY provide data in the initial response. Java SASL does
// not (currently) support this and throws an exception. For XMPP, such data violates
// the RFC, so we just strip any initial token.
doc.setText("");
}
// intended fall-through
case RESPONSE:
saslServer = (SaslServer) session.getSessionData("SaslServer");
if (saslServer == null) {
// Client sends response without a preceding auth?
throw new IllegalStateException("A SaslServer instance was not initialized and/or stored on the session.");
}
// Decode any data that is provided in the client response.
final String encoded = doc.getTextTrim();
final byte[] decoded;
if (// java SaslServer cannot handle a null.
encoded == null || encoded.isEmpty() || encoded.equals("=")) {
decoded = new byte[0];
} else {
// TODO: We shouldn't depend on regex-based validation. Instead, use a proper decoder implementation and handle any exceptions that it throws.
if (!BASE64_ENCODED.matcher(encoded).matches()) {
throw new SaslFailureException(Failure.INCORRECT_ENCODING);
}
decoded = StringUtils.decodeBase64(encoded);
}
// Process client response.
// Either a challenge or success data.
final byte[] challenge = saslServer.evaluateResponse(decoded);
if (!saslServer.isComplete()) {
// Not complete: client is challenged for additional steps.
sendChallenge(session, challenge);
return Status.needResponse;
}
// Success!
if (session instanceof IncomingServerSession) {
// Flag that indicates if certificates of the remote server should be validated.
final boolean verify = JiveGlobals.getBooleanProperty(ConnectionSettings.Server.TLS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, true);
if (verify) {
if (verifyCertificates(session.getConnection().getPeerCertificates(), saslServer.getAuthorizationID(), true)) {
((LocalIncomingServerSession) session).tlsAuth();
} else {
throw new SaslFailureException(Failure.NOT_AUTHORIZED, "Server-to-Server certificate verification failed.");
}
}
}
authenticationSuccessful(session, saslServer.getAuthorizationID(), challenge);
session.removeSessionData("SaslServer");
return Status.authenticated;
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Unexpected data received while negotiating SASL authentication. Name of the offending root element: " + doc.getName() + " Namespace: " + doc.getNamespaceURI());
}
} catch (SaslException ex) {
Log.debug("SASL negotiation failed for session: {}", session, ex);
final Failure failure;
if (ex instanceof SaslFailureException && ((SaslFailureException) ex).getFailure() != null) {
failure = ((SaslFailureException) ex).getFailure();
} else {
failure = Failure.NOT_AUTHORIZED;
}
authenticationFailed(session, failure);
session.removeSessionData("SaslServer");
return Status.failed;
} catch (Exception ex) {
Log.warn("An unexpected exception occurred during SASL negotiation. Affected session: {}", session, ex);
authenticationFailed(session, Failure.NOT_AUTHORIZED);
session.removeSessionData("SaslServer");
return Status.failed;
}
}
Aggregations