use of java.security.PublicKey in project Openfire by igniterealtime.
the class CertificateManager method buildChain.
/**
* Builds the certificate chain of the specified certificate based on the known list of certificates
* that were issued by their respective Principals. Returns true if the entire chain of all certificates
* was successfully built.
*
* @param certificate certificate to build its chain.
* @param answer the certificate chain for the corresponding certificate.
* @param knownCerts list of known certificates grouped by their issues (i.e. Principals).
* @return true if the entire chain of all certificates was successfully built.
*/
private static boolean buildChain(X509Certificate certificate, LinkedList<X509Certificate> answer, Map<String, List<X509Certificate>> knownCerts) {
Principal subject = certificate.getSubjectDN();
Principal issuer = certificate.getIssuerDN();
// is present in the subject)
if (subject.equals(issuer)) {
answer.addFirst(certificate);
return true;
}
// Get the list of known certificates of the certificate's issuer
List<X509Certificate> issuerCerts = knownCerts.get(issuer.getName());
if (issuerCerts == null || issuerCerts.isEmpty()) {
// No certificates were found so building of chain failed
return false;
}
for (X509Certificate issuerCert : issuerCerts) {
PublicKey publickey = issuerCert.getPublicKey();
try {
// Verify the certificate with the specified public key
certificate.verify(publickey);
// Certificate was verified successfully so build chain of issuer's certificate
if (!buildChain(issuerCert, answer, knownCerts)) {
return false;
}
} catch (Exception exception) {
// Failed to verify certificate
return false;
}
}
answer.addFirst(certificate);
return true;
}
use of java.security.PublicKey in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class PackageParser method parseVerifier.
private static VerifierInfo parseVerifier(Resources res, XmlPullParser parser, AttributeSet attrs, int flags, String[] outError) throws XmlPullParserException, IOException {
final TypedArray sa = res.obtainAttributes(attrs, com.android.internal.R.styleable.AndroidManifestPackageVerifier);
final String packageName = sa.getNonResourceString(com.android.internal.R.styleable.AndroidManifestPackageVerifier_name);
final String encodedPublicKey = sa.getNonResourceString(com.android.internal.R.styleable.AndroidManifestPackageVerifier_publicKey);
sa.recycle();
if (packageName == null || packageName.length() == 0) {
Slog.i(TAG, "verifier package name was null; skipping");
return null;
} else if (encodedPublicKey == null) {
Slog.i(TAG, "verifier " + packageName + " public key was null; skipping");
}
EncodedKeySpec keySpec;
try {
final byte[] encoded = Base64.decode(encodedPublicKey, Base64.DEFAULT);
keySpec = new X509EncodedKeySpec(encoded);
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
Slog.i(TAG, "Could not parse verifier " + packageName + " public key; invalid Base64");
return null;
}
/* First try the key as an RSA key. */
try {
final KeyFactory keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance("RSA");
final PublicKey publicKey = keyFactory.generatePublic(keySpec);
return new VerifierInfo(packageName, publicKey);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
Log.wtf(TAG, "Could not parse public key because RSA isn't included in build");
return null;
} catch (InvalidKeySpecException e) {
// Not a RSA public key.
}
/* Now try it as a DSA key. */
try {
final KeyFactory keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance("DSA");
final PublicKey publicKey = keyFactory.generatePublic(keySpec);
return new VerifierInfo(packageName, publicKey);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
Log.wtf(TAG, "Could not parse public key because DSA isn't included in build");
return null;
} catch (InvalidKeySpecException e) {
// Not a DSA public key.
}
return null;
}
use of java.security.PublicKey in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class RecoverySystem method verifyPackage.
/**
* Verify the cryptographic signature of a system update package
* before installing it. Note that the package is also verified
* separately by the installer once the device is rebooted into
* the recovery system. This function will return only if the
* package was successfully verified; otherwise it will throw an
* exception.
*
* Verification of a package can take significant time, so this
* function should not be called from a UI thread. Interrupting
* the thread while this function is in progress will result in a
* SecurityException being thrown (and the thread's interrupt flag
* will be cleared).
*
* @param packageFile the package to be verified
* @param listener an object to receive periodic progress
* updates as verification proceeds. May be null.
* @param deviceCertsZipFile the zip file of certificates whose
* public keys we will accept. Verification succeeds if the
* package is signed by the private key corresponding to any
* public key in this file. May be null to use the system default
* file (currently "/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip").
*
* @throws IOException if there were any errors reading the
* package or certs files.
* @throws GeneralSecurityException if verification failed
*/
public static void verifyPackage(File packageFile, ProgressListener listener, File deviceCertsZipFile) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
long fileLen = packageFile.length();
RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(packageFile, "r");
try {
int lastPercent = 0;
long lastPublishTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
raf.seek(fileLen - 6);
byte[] footer = new byte[6];
raf.readFully(footer);
if (footer[2] != (byte) 0xff || footer[3] != (byte) 0xff) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (no footer)");
}
int commentSize = (footer[4] & 0xff) | ((footer[5] & 0xff) << 8);
int signatureStart = (footer[0] & 0xff) | ((footer[1] & 0xff) << 8);
byte[] eocd = new byte[commentSize + 22];
raf.seek(fileLen - (commentSize + 22));
raf.readFully(eocd);
// end-of-central-directory record.
if (eocd[0] != (byte) 0x50 || eocd[1] != (byte) 0x4b || eocd[2] != (byte) 0x05 || eocd[3] != (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (bad footer)");
}
for (int i = 4; i < eocd.length - 3; ++i) {
if (eocd[i] == (byte) 0x50 && eocd[i + 1] == (byte) 0x4b && eocd[i + 2] == (byte) 0x05 && eocd[i + 3] == (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("EOCD marker found after start of EOCD");
}
}
// The following code is largely copied from
// JarUtils.verifySignature(). We could just *call* that
// method here if that function didn't read the entire
// input (ie, the whole OTA package) into memory just to
// compute its message digest.
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(eocd, commentSize + 22 - signatureStart, signatureStart));
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("signedData is null");
}
Collection encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
throw new IOException("encCerts is empty");
}
// Take the first certificate from the signature (packages
// should contain only one).
Iterator it = encCerts.iterator();
X509Certificate cert = null;
if (it.hasNext()) {
cert = new X509CertImpl((org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate) it.next());
} else {
throw new SignatureException("signature contains no certificates");
}
List sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = (SignerInfo) sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
throw new IOException("no signer infos!");
}
// Check that the public key of the certificate contained
// in the package equals one of our trusted public keys.
HashSet<Certificate> trusted = getTrustedCerts(deviceCertsZipFile == null ? DEFAULT_KEYSTORE : deviceCertsZipFile);
PublicKey signatureKey = cert.getPublicKey();
boolean verified = false;
for (Certificate c : trusted) {
if (c.getPublicKey().equals(signatureKey)) {
verified = true;
break;
}
}
if (!verified) {
throw new SignatureException("signature doesn't match any trusted key");
}
// The signature cert matches a trusted key. Now verify that
// the digest in the cert matches the actual file data.
// The verifier in recovery *only* handles SHA1withRSA
// signatures. SignApk.java always uses SHA1withRSA, no
// matter what the cert says to use. Ignore
// cert.getSigAlgName(), and instead use whatever
// algorithm is used by the signature (which should be
// SHA1withRSA).
String da = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
String dea = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
String alg = null;
if (da == null || dea == null) {
// fall back to the cert algorithm if the sig one
// doesn't look right.
alg = cert.getSigAlgName();
} else {
alg = da + "with" + dea;
}
Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
sig.initVerify(cert);
// The signature covers all of the OTA package except the
// archive comment and its 2-byte length.
long toRead = fileLen - commentSize - 2;
long soFar = 0;
raf.seek(0);
byte[] buffer = new byte[4096];
boolean interrupted = false;
while (soFar < toRead) {
interrupted = Thread.interrupted();
if (interrupted)
break;
int size = buffer.length;
if (soFar + size > toRead) {
size = (int) (toRead - soFar);
}
int read = raf.read(buffer, 0, size);
sig.update(buffer, 0, read);
soFar += read;
if (listener != null) {
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
int p = (int) (soFar * 100 / toRead);
if (p > lastPercent && now - lastPublishTime > PUBLISH_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS) {
lastPercent = p;
lastPublishTime = now;
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
}
}
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(100);
}
if (interrupted) {
throw new SignatureException("verification was interrupted");
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SignatureException("signature digest verification failed");
}
} finally {
raf.close();
}
}
use of java.security.PublicKey in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class AndroidKeyStoreTest method testKeyStore_KeyOperations_Wrap_Encrypted_Success.
public void testKeyStore_KeyOperations_Wrap_Encrypted_Success() throws Exception {
setupPassword();
mKeyStore.load(null, null);
setupKey();
// Test key usage
Entry e = mKeyStore.getEntry(TEST_ALIAS_1, null);
assertNotNull(e);
assertTrue(e instanceof PrivateKeyEntry);
PrivateKeyEntry privEntry = (PrivateKeyEntry) e;
PrivateKey privKey = privEntry.getPrivateKey();
assertNotNull(privKey);
PublicKey pubKey = privEntry.getCertificate().getPublicKey();
Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding");
c.init(Cipher.WRAP_MODE, pubKey);
byte[] expectedKey = new byte[] { 0x00, 0x05, (byte) 0xAA, (byte) 0x0A5, (byte) 0xFF, 0x55, 0x0A };
SecretKey expectedSecret = new SecretKeySpec(expectedKey, "AES");
byte[] wrappedExpected = c.wrap(expectedSecret);
c.init(Cipher.UNWRAP_MODE, privKey);
SecretKey actualSecret = (SecretKey) c.unwrap(wrappedExpected, "AES", Cipher.SECRET_KEY);
assertEquals(Arrays.toString(expectedSecret.getEncoded()), Arrays.toString(actualSecret.getEncoded()));
}
use of java.security.PublicKey in project OpenAM by OpenRock.
the class KeyUtil method getEncInfo.
/**
* Returns the encryption information which will be used in
* encrypting messages intended for the partner entity.
* @param roled <code>RoleDescriptor</code> for the partner entity
* @param entityID partner entity's ID
* @param role entity's role
* @return <code>EncInfo</code> which includes partner entity's
* public key for wrapping the secret key, data encryption algorithm,
* and data encryption strength
*/
public static EncInfo getEncInfo(RoleDescriptorType roled, String entityID, String role) {
String classMethod = "KeyUtil.getEncInfo: ";
if (SAML2SDKUtils.debug.messageEnabled()) {
SAML2SDKUtils.debug.message(classMethod + "Entering... \nEntityID=" + entityID + "\nRole=" + role);
}
// first try to get it from cache
String index = entityID.trim() + "|" + role;
EncInfo encInfo = (EncInfo) encHash.get(index);
if (encInfo != null) {
return encInfo;
}
// else get it from meta
if (roled == null) {
SAML2SDKUtils.debug.error(classMethod + "Null RoleDescriptorType input for entityID=" + entityID + " in " + role + " role.");
return null;
}
KeyDescriptorType kd = getKeyDescriptor(roled, SAML2Constants.ENCRYPTION);
if (kd == null) {
SAML2SDKUtils.debug.error(classMethod + "No encryption KeyDescriptor for entityID=" + entityID + " in " + role + " role.");
return null;
}
java.security.cert.X509Certificate cert = getCert(kd);
if (cert == null) {
SAML2SDKUtils.debug.error(classMethod + "No encryption cert for entityID=" + entityID + " in " + role + " role.");
return null;
}
List emList = kd.getEncryptionMethod();
EncryptionMethodType em = null;
String algorithm = null;
int keySize = 0;
if (emList != null && !emList.isEmpty()) {
em = (EncryptionMethodType) emList.get(0);
if (em != null) {
algorithm = em.getAlgorithm();
List cList = em.getContent();
if (cList != null) {
Iterator cIter = cList.iterator();
while (cIter.hasNext()) {
Object cObject = cIter.next();
if (cObject instanceof EncryptionMethodType.KeySize) {
keySize = ((EncryptionMethodType.KeySize) (cList.get(0))).getValue().intValue();
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if (algorithm == null || algorithm.length() == 0) {
algorithm = XMLCipher.AES_128;
keySize = 128;
}
PublicKey pk = cert.getPublicKey();
if (pk != null) {
encInfo = new EncInfo(pk, algorithm, keySize);
}
if (encInfo != null) {
encHash.put(index, encInfo);
}
return encInfo;
}
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