use of java.security.Signature in project Fairphone by Kwamecorp.
the class RSAUtils method verifySignature.
public static boolean verifySignature(String input, String algorithm, byte[] sign, PublicKey pubKey) throws Exception {
Signature sg = Signature.getInstance(algorithm);
sg.initVerify(pubKey);
Log.i(TAG, "Signature Object Info: ");
Log.i(TAG, "Algorithm = " + sg.getAlgorithm());
Log.i(TAG, "Provider = " + sg.getProvider());
FileInputStream in = new FileInputStream(input);
byte[] buff = new byte[in.available()];
in.read(buff);
in.close();
sg.update(buff);
boolean ok = sg.verify(sign);
Log.i(TAG, "Verify Processing Info: ");
Log.i(TAG, "Verification result = " + ok);
return ok;
}
use of java.security.Signature in project walle by Meituan-Dianping.
the class V2SchemeVerifier method parseSigner.
/**
* Parses the provided signer block and populates the {@code result}.
*
* <p>This verifies signatures over {@code signed-data} contained in this block but does not
* verify the integrity of the rest of the APK. Rather, this method adds to the
* {@code contentDigestsToVerify}.
*/
private static void parseSigner(ByteBuffer signerBlock, CertificateFactory certFactory, Result.SignerInfo result, Set<ContentDigestAlgorithm> contentDigestsToVerify) throws IOException {
ByteBuffer signedData = getLengthPrefixedSlice(signerBlock);
byte[] signedDataBytes = new byte[signedData.remaining()];
signedData.get(signedDataBytes);
signedData.flip();
result.signedData = signedDataBytes;
ByteBuffer signatures = getLengthPrefixedSlice(signerBlock);
byte[] publicKeyBytes = readLengthPrefixedByteArray(signerBlock);
// Parse the signatures block and identify supported signatures
int signatureCount = 0;
List<SupportedSignature> supportedSignatures = new ArrayList<>(1);
while (signatures.hasRemaining()) {
signatureCount++;
try {
ByteBuffer signature = getLengthPrefixedSlice(signatures);
int sigAlgorithmId = signature.getInt();
byte[] sigBytes = readLengthPrefixedByteArray(signature);
result.signatures.add(new Result.SignerInfo.Signature(sigAlgorithmId, sigBytes));
SignatureAlgorithm signatureAlgorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.findById(sigAlgorithmId);
if (signatureAlgorithm == null) {
result.addWarning(Issue.V2_SIG_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALGORITHM, sigAlgorithmId);
continue;
}
supportedSignatures.add(new SupportedSignature(signatureAlgorithm, sigBytes));
} catch (IOException | BufferUnderflowException e) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_MALFORMED_SIGNATURE, signatureCount);
return;
}
}
if (result.signatures.isEmpty()) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_NO_SIGNATURES);
return;
}
// Verify signatures over signed-data block using the public key
List<SupportedSignature> signaturesToVerify = getSignaturesToVerify(supportedSignatures);
if (signaturesToVerify.isEmpty()) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURES);
return;
}
for (SupportedSignature signature : signaturesToVerify) {
SignatureAlgorithm signatureAlgorithm = signature.algorithm;
String jcaSignatureAlgorithm = signatureAlgorithm.getJcaSignatureAlgorithmAndParams().getFirst();
AlgorithmParameterSpec jcaSignatureAlgorithmParams = signatureAlgorithm.getJcaSignatureAlgorithmAndParams().getSecond();
String keyAlgorithm = signatureAlgorithm.getJcaKeyAlgorithm();
PublicKey publicKey;
try {
publicKey = KeyFactory.getInstance(keyAlgorithm).generatePublic(new X509EncodedKeySpec(publicKeyBytes));
} catch (Exception e) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_MALFORMED_PUBLIC_KEY, e);
return;
}
try {
Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(jcaSignatureAlgorithm);
sig.initVerify(publicKey);
if (jcaSignatureAlgorithmParams != null) {
sig.setParameter(jcaSignatureAlgorithmParams);
}
signedData.position(0);
sig.update(signedData);
byte[] sigBytes = signature.signature;
if (!sig.verify(sigBytes)) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_DID_NOT_VERIFY, signatureAlgorithm);
return;
}
result.verifiedSignatures.put(signatureAlgorithm, sigBytes);
contentDigestsToVerify.add(signatureAlgorithm.getContentDigestAlgorithm());
} catch (Exception e) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_VERIFY_EXCEPTION, signatureAlgorithm, e);
return;
}
}
// At least one signature over signedData has verified. We can now parse signed-data.
signedData.position(0);
ByteBuffer digests = getLengthPrefixedSlice(signedData);
ByteBuffer certificates = getLengthPrefixedSlice(signedData);
ByteBuffer additionalAttributes = getLengthPrefixedSlice(signedData);
// Parse the certificates block
int certificateIndex = -1;
while (certificates.hasRemaining()) {
certificateIndex++;
byte[] encodedCert = readLengthPrefixedByteArray(certificates);
X509Certificate certificate;
try {
certificate = (X509Certificate) certFactory.generateCertificate(new ByteArrayInputStream(encodedCert));
} catch (CertificateException e) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, certificateIndex, certificateIndex + 1, e);
return;
}
// Wrap the cert so that the result's getEncoded returns exactly the original encoded
// form. Without this, getEncoded may return a different form from what was stored in
// the signature. This is becase some X509Certificate(Factory) implementations re-encode
// certificates.
certificate = new GuaranteedEncodedFormX509Certificate(certificate, encodedCert);
result.certs.add(certificate);
}
if (result.certs.isEmpty()) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_NO_CERTIFICATES);
return;
}
X509Certificate mainCertificate = result.certs.get(0);
byte[] certificatePublicKeyBytes = mainCertificate.getPublicKey().getEncoded();
if (!Arrays.equals(publicKeyBytes, certificatePublicKeyBytes)) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_PUBLIC_KEY_MISMATCH_BETWEEN_CERTIFICATE_AND_SIGNATURES_RECORD, toHex(certificatePublicKeyBytes), toHex(publicKeyBytes));
return;
}
// Parse the digests block
int digestCount = 0;
while (digests.hasRemaining()) {
digestCount++;
try {
ByteBuffer digest = getLengthPrefixedSlice(digests);
int sigAlgorithmId = digest.getInt();
byte[] digestBytes = readLengthPrefixedByteArray(digest);
result.contentDigests.add(new Result.SignerInfo.ContentDigest(sigAlgorithmId, digestBytes));
} catch (IOException | BufferUnderflowException e) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_MALFORMED_DIGEST, digestCount);
return;
}
}
List<Integer> sigAlgsFromSignaturesRecord = new ArrayList<>(result.signatures.size());
for (Result.SignerInfo.Signature signature : result.signatures) {
sigAlgsFromSignaturesRecord.add(signature.getAlgorithmId());
}
List<Integer> sigAlgsFromDigestsRecord = new ArrayList<>(result.contentDigests.size());
for (Result.SignerInfo.ContentDigest digest : result.contentDigests) {
sigAlgsFromDigestsRecord.add(digest.getSignatureAlgorithmId());
}
if (!sigAlgsFromSignaturesRecord.equals(sigAlgsFromDigestsRecord)) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_SIG_ALG_MISMATCH_BETWEEN_SIGNATURES_AND_DIGESTS_RECORDS, sigAlgsFromSignaturesRecord, sigAlgsFromDigestsRecord);
return;
}
// Parse the additional attributes block.
int additionalAttributeCount = 0;
while (additionalAttributes.hasRemaining()) {
additionalAttributeCount++;
try {
ByteBuffer attribute = getLengthPrefixedSlice(additionalAttributes);
int id = attribute.getInt();
byte[] value = readLengthPrefixedByteArray(attribute);
result.additionalAttributes.add(new Result.SignerInfo.AdditionalAttribute(id, value));
result.addWarning(Issue.V2_SIG_UNKNOWN_ADDITIONAL_ATTRIBUTE, id);
} catch (IOException | BufferUnderflowException e) {
result.addError(Issue.V2_SIG_MALFORMED_ADDITIONAL_ATTRIBUTE, additionalAttributeCount);
return;
}
}
}
use of java.security.Signature in project android_frameworks_base by ParanoidAndroid.
the class RecoverySystem method verifyPackage.
/**
* Verify the cryptographic signature of a system update package
* before installing it. Note that the package is also verified
* separately by the installer once the device is rebooted into
* the recovery system. This function will return only if the
* package was successfully verified; otherwise it will throw an
* exception.
*
* Verification of a package can take significant time, so this
* function should not be called from a UI thread. Interrupting
* the thread while this function is in progress will result in a
* SecurityException being thrown (and the thread's interrupt flag
* will be cleared).
*
* @param packageFile the package to be verified
* @param listener an object to receive periodic progress
* updates as verification proceeds. May be null.
* @param deviceCertsZipFile the zip file of certificates whose
* public keys we will accept. Verification succeeds if the
* package is signed by the private key corresponding to any
* public key in this file. May be null to use the system default
* file (currently "/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip").
*
* @throws IOException if there were any errors reading the
* package or certs files.
* @throws GeneralSecurityException if verification failed
*/
public static void verifyPackage(File packageFile, ProgressListener listener, File deviceCertsZipFile) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
long fileLen = packageFile.length();
RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(packageFile, "r");
try {
int lastPercent = 0;
long lastPublishTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
raf.seek(fileLen - 6);
byte[] footer = new byte[6];
raf.readFully(footer);
if (footer[2] != (byte) 0xff || footer[3] != (byte) 0xff) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (no footer)");
}
int commentSize = (footer[4] & 0xff) | ((footer[5] & 0xff) << 8);
int signatureStart = (footer[0] & 0xff) | ((footer[1] & 0xff) << 8);
byte[] eocd = new byte[commentSize + 22];
raf.seek(fileLen - (commentSize + 22));
raf.readFully(eocd);
// end-of-central-directory record.
if (eocd[0] != (byte) 0x50 || eocd[1] != (byte) 0x4b || eocd[2] != (byte) 0x05 || eocd[3] != (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (bad footer)");
}
for (int i = 4; i < eocd.length - 3; ++i) {
if (eocd[i] == (byte) 0x50 && eocd[i + 1] == (byte) 0x4b && eocd[i + 2] == (byte) 0x05 && eocd[i + 3] == (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("EOCD marker found after start of EOCD");
}
}
// The following code is largely copied from
// JarUtils.verifySignature(). We could just *call* that
// method here if that function didn't read the entire
// input (ie, the whole OTA package) into memory just to
// compute its message digest.
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(eocd, commentSize + 22 - signatureStart, signatureStart));
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("signedData is null");
}
Collection encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
throw new IOException("encCerts is empty");
}
// Take the first certificate from the signature (packages
// should contain only one).
Iterator it = encCerts.iterator();
X509Certificate cert = null;
if (it.hasNext()) {
cert = new X509CertImpl((org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate) it.next());
} else {
throw new SignatureException("signature contains no certificates");
}
List sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = (SignerInfo) sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
throw new IOException("no signer infos!");
}
// Check that the public key of the certificate contained
// in the package equals one of our trusted public keys.
HashSet<Certificate> trusted = getTrustedCerts(deviceCertsZipFile == null ? DEFAULT_KEYSTORE : deviceCertsZipFile);
PublicKey signatureKey = cert.getPublicKey();
boolean verified = false;
for (Certificate c : trusted) {
if (c.getPublicKey().equals(signatureKey)) {
verified = true;
break;
}
}
if (!verified) {
throw new SignatureException("signature doesn't match any trusted key");
}
// The signature cert matches a trusted key. Now verify that
// the digest in the cert matches the actual file data.
// The verifier in recovery *only* handles SHA1withRSA
// signatures. SignApk.java always uses SHA1withRSA, no
// matter what the cert says to use. Ignore
// cert.getSigAlgName(), and instead use whatever
// algorithm is used by the signature (which should be
// SHA1withRSA).
String da = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
String dea = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
String alg = null;
if (da == null || dea == null) {
// fall back to the cert algorithm if the sig one
// doesn't look right.
alg = cert.getSigAlgName();
} else {
alg = da + "with" + dea;
}
Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
sig.initVerify(cert);
// The signature covers all of the OTA package except the
// archive comment and its 2-byte length.
long toRead = fileLen - commentSize - 2;
long soFar = 0;
raf.seek(0);
byte[] buffer = new byte[4096];
boolean interrupted = false;
while (soFar < toRead) {
interrupted = Thread.interrupted();
if (interrupted)
break;
int size = buffer.length;
if (soFar + size > toRead) {
size = (int) (toRead - soFar);
}
int read = raf.read(buffer, 0, size);
sig.update(buffer, 0, read);
soFar += read;
if (listener != null) {
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
int p = (int) (soFar * 100 / toRead);
if (p > lastPercent && now - lastPublishTime > PUBLISH_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS) {
lastPercent = p;
lastPublishTime = now;
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
}
}
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(100);
}
if (interrupted) {
throw new SignatureException("verification was interrupted");
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SignatureException("signature digest verification failed");
}
} finally {
raf.close();
}
}
use of java.security.Signature in project jersey by jersey.
the class RsaSha1Method method sign.
/**
* Generates the RSA-SHA1 signature of OAuth request elements.
*
* @param baseString the combined OAuth elements to sign.
* @param secrets the secrets object containing the private key for generating the signature.
* @return the OAuth signature, in base64-encoded form.
* @throws InvalidSecretException if the supplied secret is not valid.
*/
@Override
public String sign(final String baseString, final OAuth1Secrets secrets) throws InvalidSecretException {
final Signature signature;
try {
signature = Signature.getInstance(SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
} catch (final NoSuchAlgorithmException nsae) {
throw new IllegalStateException(nsae);
}
byte[] decodedPrivateKey;
try {
decodedPrivateKey = Base64.decode(secrets.getConsumerSecret());
} catch (final IOException ioe) {
throw new InvalidSecretException(LocalizationMessages.ERROR_INVALID_CONSUMER_SECRET(ioe));
}
final KeyFactory keyFactory;
try {
keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance(KEY_TYPE);
} catch (final NoSuchAlgorithmException nsae) {
throw new IllegalStateException(nsae);
}
final EncodedKeySpec keySpec = new PKCS8EncodedKeySpec(decodedPrivateKey);
final RSAPrivateKey rsaPrivateKey;
try {
rsaPrivateKey = (RSAPrivateKey) keyFactory.generatePrivate(keySpec);
} catch (final InvalidKeySpecException ikse) {
throw new IllegalStateException(ikse);
}
try {
signature.initSign(rsaPrivateKey);
} catch (final InvalidKeyException ike) {
throw new IllegalStateException(ike);
}
try {
signature.update(baseString.getBytes());
} catch (final SignatureException se) {
throw new IllegalStateException(se);
}
final byte[] rsasha1;
try {
rsasha1 = signature.sign();
} catch (final SignatureException se) {
throw new IllegalStateException(se);
}
return Base64.encode(rsasha1);
}
use of java.security.Signature in project XobotOS by xamarin.
the class RecoverySystem method verifyPackage.
/**
* Verify the cryptographic signature of a system update package
* before installing it. Note that the package is also verified
* separately by the installer once the device is rebooted into
* the recovery system. This function will return only if the
* package was successfully verified; otherwise it will throw an
* exception.
*
* Verification of a package can take significant time, so this
* function should not be called from a UI thread. Interrupting
* the thread while this function is in progress will result in a
* SecurityException being thrown (and the thread's interrupt flag
* will be cleared).
*
* @param packageFile the package to be verified
* @param listener an object to receive periodic progress
* updates as verification proceeds. May be null.
* @param deviceCertsZipFile the zip file of certificates whose
* public keys we will accept. Verification succeeds if the
* package is signed by the private key corresponding to any
* public key in this file. May be null to use the system default
* file (currently "/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip").
*
* @throws IOException if there were any errors reading the
* package or certs files.
* @throws GeneralSecurityException if verification failed
*/
public static void verifyPackage(File packageFile, ProgressListener listener, File deviceCertsZipFile) throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
long fileLen = packageFile.length();
RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(packageFile, "r");
try {
int lastPercent = 0;
long lastPublishTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
raf.seek(fileLen - 6);
byte[] footer = new byte[6];
raf.readFully(footer);
if (footer[2] != (byte) 0xff || footer[3] != (byte) 0xff) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (no footer)");
}
int commentSize = (footer[4] & 0xff) | ((footer[5] & 0xff) << 8);
int signatureStart = (footer[0] & 0xff) | ((footer[1] & 0xff) << 8);
Log.v(TAG, String.format("comment size %d; signature start %d", commentSize, signatureStart));
byte[] eocd = new byte[commentSize + 22];
raf.seek(fileLen - (commentSize + 22));
raf.readFully(eocd);
// end-of-central-directory record.
if (eocd[0] != (byte) 0x50 || eocd[1] != (byte) 0x4b || eocd[2] != (byte) 0x05 || eocd[3] != (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("no signature in file (bad footer)");
}
for (int i = 4; i < eocd.length - 3; ++i) {
if (eocd[i] == (byte) 0x50 && eocd[i + 1] == (byte) 0x4b && eocd[i + 2] == (byte) 0x05 && eocd[i + 3] == (byte) 0x06) {
throw new SignatureException("EOCD marker found after start of EOCD");
}
}
// The following code is largely copied from
// JarUtils.verifySignature(). We could just *call* that
// method here if that function didn't read the entire
// input (ie, the whole OTA package) into memory just to
// compute its message digest.
BerInputStream bis = new BerInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(eocd, commentSize + 22 - signatureStart, signatureStart));
ContentInfo info = (ContentInfo) ContentInfo.ASN1.decode(bis);
SignedData signedData = info.getSignedData();
if (signedData == null) {
throw new IOException("signedData is null");
}
Collection encCerts = signedData.getCertificates();
if (encCerts.isEmpty()) {
throw new IOException("encCerts is empty");
}
// Take the first certificate from the signature (packages
// should contain only one).
Iterator it = encCerts.iterator();
X509Certificate cert = null;
if (it.hasNext()) {
cert = new X509CertImpl((org.apache.harmony.security.x509.Certificate) it.next());
} else {
throw new SignatureException("signature contains no certificates");
}
List sigInfos = signedData.getSignerInfos();
SignerInfo sigInfo;
if (!sigInfos.isEmpty()) {
sigInfo = (SignerInfo) sigInfos.get(0);
} else {
throw new IOException("no signer infos!");
}
// Check that the public key of the certificate contained
// in the package equals one of our trusted public keys.
HashSet<Certificate> trusted = getTrustedCerts(deviceCertsZipFile == null ? DEFAULT_KEYSTORE : deviceCertsZipFile);
PublicKey signatureKey = cert.getPublicKey();
boolean verified = false;
for (Certificate c : trusted) {
if (c.getPublicKey().equals(signatureKey)) {
verified = true;
break;
}
}
if (!verified) {
throw new SignatureException("signature doesn't match any trusted key");
}
// The signature cert matches a trusted key. Now verify that
// the digest in the cert matches the actual file data.
// The verifier in recovery *only* handles SHA1withRSA
// signatures. SignApk.java always uses SHA1withRSA, no
// matter what the cert says to use. Ignore
// cert.getSigAlgName(), and instead use whatever
// algorithm is used by the signature (which should be
// SHA1withRSA).
String da = sigInfo.getDigestAlgorithm();
String dea = sigInfo.getDigestEncryptionAlgorithm();
String alg = null;
if (da == null || dea == null) {
// fall back to the cert algorithm if the sig one
// doesn't look right.
alg = cert.getSigAlgName();
} else {
alg = da + "with" + dea;
}
Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(alg);
sig.initVerify(cert);
// The signature covers all of the OTA package except the
// archive comment and its 2-byte length.
long toRead = fileLen - commentSize - 2;
long soFar = 0;
raf.seek(0);
byte[] buffer = new byte[4096];
boolean interrupted = false;
while (soFar < toRead) {
interrupted = Thread.interrupted();
if (interrupted)
break;
int size = buffer.length;
if (soFar + size > toRead) {
size = (int) (toRead - soFar);
}
int read = raf.read(buffer, 0, size);
sig.update(buffer, 0, read);
soFar += read;
if (listener != null) {
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
int p = (int) (soFar * 100 / toRead);
if (p > lastPercent && now - lastPublishTime > PUBLISH_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS) {
lastPercent = p;
lastPublishTime = now;
listener.onProgress(lastPercent);
}
}
}
if (listener != null) {
listener.onProgress(100);
}
if (interrupted) {
throw new SignatureException("verification was interrupted");
}
if (!sig.verify(sigInfo.getEncryptedDigest())) {
throw new SignatureException("signature digest verification failed");
}
} finally {
raf.close();
}
}
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